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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last couple of decades, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been a 
popular mechanism used by organizations to grow and expand their business and obtain 
the capabilities and resources that they require to compete.  This is demonstrated by the 
volume of M&A transactions.  It is estimated that in the year 2000 over $3 trillion was 
spent on mergers and acquisitions on a worldwide basis and yet failure rates are estimated 
at over fifty-five percent (Schoenberg, 2006; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006).  
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999: 2) concluded that “mergers and acquisitions are clearly 
multi-faceted phenomena that are poorly understood through incomplete and partial 
application of theories from separate fields.”  For several decades, researchers within the 
fields of finance, organizational theory, economics and strategy have conducted studies in 
this area (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Lubatkin, 1983; Zollo and Singh, 2004), but still 
there is a limited understanding of the elements and skills required to engage in a value-
added merger and acquisition.  Results to date have been disappointing.  King, Dalton, 
Daily and Covin (2004), in their meta analysis of  empirical M&A studies, summarized 
the last two decades of research and concluded that beyond the day of the announcement, 
performance of acquiring firms within M&A is zero or slightly negative.  In their meta 
analysis, they identified variables such as diversification level, method of payment and 
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acquisition experience, that have been most commonly examined in relationship to 
acquisition performance, and concluded that these variables have not provided 
appropriate explanation of performance.  However, they found that there were variables 
that the researchers have not yet identified that may explain significant variance in post 
acquisition performance and recommended that a fruitful endeavor for subsequent 
research is to identify the conditions that can lead to superior performance (King et al., 
2004).  This research identifies some of these variables and thus will not only improve 
theoretical understanding merger implementation performance, but will also provide 
advice for managers. 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the retention of target executives 
along with the competencies and resources that they possess can positively affect post-
merger effectiveness.  Since empirical research has provided evidence that a majority of 
mergers and acquisitions do not reach stated objectives, additional research in this area is 
needed and warranted (Homburg and Bucerius, 2005).  The pre-merger management 
team and post-merger management team characteristics will be studied to increase our 
understanding of what facilitates a successful merger implementation.  It will investigate 
the impact of the chief executive officer (CEO) and top management team (TMT) power 
dimensions (Finkelstein, 1992) of the acquiring and target firms on subsequent merger 
effectiveness.  Specifically, it will be examining prestige and expert power that exists in 
the pre-acquisition firm and the retention of these power dimensions in the post-merger 
firm.  
Throughout this dissertation the term “merger”, “acquisition” or “merger and 
acquisition (M&A)” will be used interchangeably to describe the same phenomena as that 
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is a convention that has been used by previous empirical researchers and both terms tend 
to describe the same process and have the same underlying structure and the equivalent 
types of behaviors (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; King et al., 2004; Lubatkin and 
Shrieves, 1986).  This chapter will provide an overview of M&A research and then will 
address the theoretical base for the research, the research question, along with the 
dissertation objectives and the contributions of this research.   
Theoretical Base for Research 
 
The focus of analysis for the majority of empirical studies has been the acquiring 
firm.  However, recently there has been a call to change this focus to either the target firm 
(Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004) or the combined post-integration firm (Gu, 2004; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Zhao, 2002).  The focus of analysis for the dependent 
variable for this study is the post-acquisition firm.  This dissertation will be comparing 
the performance of the combined firm to performance that may have accrued if the 
companies did not merge. 
Zollo and Singh (2004) found that the retention of top managers from the target 
firm and an increased level of integration between the two merged firms are positively 
related to performance.  Hambrick and Cannella (1993) found that providing one or more 
executives from the target firm with top management team status in the newly combined 
firm leads to better post acquisition performance and that the departure of executives 
from the acquired firms is related to poorer post acquisition performance.  Consequently, 
it is believed that examining pre-merger management team characteristics with post-
merger management team characteristics can isolate some of these unidentified variables 
alluded to by King et al. (2004).  
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The theoretical base for this dissertation will be the resource based view of a firm 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and this theory will be complemented with top 
management team research.   
Resource-based View of a Firm 
“Acquisitions represent an investment intended to create economic value, 
especially through the development of synergies” (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 
1991; 175).  Within the strategy literature, one reason given for M&A activity is to 
acquire resources and/or competencies (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Hayward, 2002) that can 
allow the organization to create and sustain a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984).  These competencies and resources are often embedded within the 
people.  Some organizations are already outperforming the industry and they engage in a 
M&A to continue their competitive advantage.  Other organizations engage in this 
activity to obtain a resource and/or competency that will allow them to move up to or 
exceed the industry average (Markovitch, Steckel and Yeung, 2005). 
 The acquisition of resources is not the only reason why an executive may 
undertake a merger.  Since executives are compensated for higher levels of responsibility 
and complexity (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987), research also provides support 
that executives may undertake a M&A attributable to hubris (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005; Roll, 1986; Trautwein, 1990), expansion of their 
sphere of influence (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Baumol, 1962) or maximization of personal 
wealth (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Kroll, Wright, Toombs and Leavell, 1997; 
Trautwein, 1990).  However, this dissertation is attempting to identify synergistic 
mergers (Harrison et al., 1991) that have been undertaken to improve productivity and to 
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obtain scarce resources and competencies (Barney, 1991) as Harrison et al (1991) 
concluded that the examination of resources rather than strategy types will better explain 
post acquisition firm performance. 
Top Management Team Characteristics 
This study addresses the question of how corporate elites affect corporate strategy 
in the area of mergers and acquisitions.  Previous research has found a relationship 
between demographic characteristics such as education, functional background, age, 
power and strategy preferences to organizational outcomes (Finkelstein, 1992; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  There is 
empirical support that the functional background of the top management team and the 
CEO, coupled with their strategic preferences and experiences, can affect acquisition 
activities (Finkelstein, 1992; Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Palmer and Barber, 2001; Song, 
1982; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  For example prior researchers have found that 
finance executives will diversify the firm’s portfolio of businesses more than non-finance 
executives (Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Finkelstein, 1992; Palmer and Barber, 2001; Song, 
1982).  
Dissertation Objectives 
 
Even though the M&A failure rate is high, mergers are still occurring at a 
significant pace.  This suggests that executives believe there is value in continuing to 
engage in mergers and acquisitions.  In mergers that were deemed to be successful, 
researchers have determined that value creation occurs after the acquisition (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991).  However, very little research within M&A literature has 
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concentrated on the impact of CEO and TMT power characteristics of the acquiring and 
target firms on subsequent merger firm effectiveness (Krishnan and Park, 2003).  The 
purpose of this study is to examine pre-merger management team power characteristics of 
both the acquiring and target firms with the retention of power in the post-merger firm to 
determine if the M&A was able to obtain the resources and competencies the acquiring 
firm was striving to obtain.  It also investigates the moderating role of organizational 
slack on this relationship as Gary (2005) found that even when synergy opportunities 
exist, that the absence of slack will destroy value due to insufficient attention to merger 
implementation issues.  Another purpose is to examine the relationship between power 
retention in the post-merger firm and merger effectiveness. 
A model of this process is shown in Figure 1.  The potential contributions of this 
study include an appreciation of what drives an effective acquisition and includes: [1] an 
expanded understanding of CEO and TMT power characteristics on merger effectiveness; 
and [2] knowledge on the interaction effect of slack on post-merger power retention.  
Contributions 
 
This research makes two distinct contributions.  The first being the contribution to 
the field of academic scholarship and second, the contribution to management 
practitioners.  
Academic Contribution 
This research will add to the literature by expanding our understanding of the 
effect of executive power and organizational slack on M&A performance.  It investigates 
the various types of power that exist within the pre-acquisition firms and how these types 
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of power can be retained.  It also examines the relationship between retained power in the 
post-merger firm with post-merger effectiveness and provides some empirical support on 
which types of power are the most important to obtain.  This research will also test the 
importance of organizational slack and will identify implementation issues that acquiring 
organization should avoid to capitalize on the synergies they are expecting to obtain.  As 
researchers understand these characteristics and expand their theoretical base by 
incorporating more sophisticated models, they will be better able to predict and explain 
behavior and this will subsequently provide a platform upon which additional research 
can be directed.  It will answer these important questions: 1) Why are some mergers more 
successful than others? and 2) What top management factors power characteristics 
influence the effectiveness of a merger or acquisition? 
Contributions to Practitioners 
This study will provide managers of the acquiring firm with tools and processes 
that optimize the retention of competencies that they were attempting to acquire.  It will 
identify the types of power that exist in the pre-acquisition firms and provide direction as 
to the types of power that should be retained to increase post-merger performance and 
provide the firm with a strategic competitive advantage within their industry.  This 
research will also test the importance of organizational slack and will identify 
implementation issues that acquiring organization should avoid to capitalize on the 
synergies they are expecting to obtain.  Armed with this information, the acquiring firm 
managers will be better equiped to engage in a successful acquisition.  
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Dissertation Overview 
 
Chapter two provides a review of the merger and acquisition literature as it relates 
to top management team influences and acquisition processes and concludes with a 
statement of the dissertation hypotheses.  Chapter three discusses the methodology and 
research design that will be utilized to test these hypotheses.  Chapter four provides an 
overview of the results and Chapter five integrates the results from this study with the 
M&A literature and provides a statement of limitations and ideas for future research.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Since Dewing’s (1921) and Livermore’s (1935) pioneer discussions of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), social science scholars have sought to determine what actions 
and behaviors will enhance the outcomes of M&A activities (Datta, Rajagopalan and 
Rasheed, 1991; Dess, Gupta, Hennart and Hill, 1995 ).  Kitching (1967) is credited with 
providing one of the first empirical reviews within the merger and acquisition research 
stream.  To understand mergers and acquisitions he conducted interviews and determined 
that one reason M&A fail is because of disturbed reporting relationships within the post-
acquisition firm.  Since these early beginnings, many academics have explored this 
phenomenon using multiple theoretical lenses (King et al., 2004; Larsson and Finkelstein, 
1999).  The motive for the merger for economic researchers has included concepts such 
as economies of scale and market power (Jensen, 1988; Matsuaka, 1993; Steiner, 1975) 
and more recently they are examining industry effects and deregulation to obtain 
additional understanding on why mergers and acquisitions occur in waves (Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2001).  Finance researchers have focused on wealth creation or 
reduction (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2005) and as a consequence have most often 
utilized stock market measures with the assumption that investors will integrate all 
important factors when they reevaluate the stock price (Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman, 
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2001; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Mandelker, 1974; Travlos, 1987).  Strategic 
management researchers have studied M&A and have attempted to understand it on the 
bases of diversification and synergy (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Kusewitt, 1985; 
Lubatkin, 1983; Seth, 1990; Singh and Mongomery, 1987).  As an example, strategy 
researchers have examined the link between degree and type of relatedness between the 
acquiring and target firm to assess if these variables have power to predict the outcome of 
a merger (Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin, 1983).  Organizational theorists have focused on 
organizational integration as the independent variable (Pablo, 1994; Shrivastava, 1986) 
and human resource management researchers have taken on a more micro view and have 
attempted to understand merger success or failure on the basis of employee resistance 
(Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Hayes, 1979; Marks, 1982; Marks and Mirvis, 1985).  
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) developed a model to help bridge the gap between 
the various disciplines by taking learning from each of these research streams and 
incorporating this knowledge into a more integrated framework (See Figure 2).  They 
developed and tested a model that incorporated employee resistance, organizational 
integration and combination potential (relatedness) to determine how these constructs 
may interact.  The authors concluded that organizational integration was the strongest 
predictor of M&A success and yet ironically, they found that 40% of the companies 
studied did not appropriately manage the integration process.  
Even though the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions has been studied for 
over half a century, King et al. (2004) in their meta analysis concluded that none of the 
four most commonly researched variables were sufficient in explaining post-acquisition 
performance.  The four factors that had been studied sufficiently to be included in their 
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meta analysis were 1) level of diversification, 2) relatedness, 3) method of payment and 
4) acquisition experience.  Their study indicated that post-implementation performance is 
influenced by unspecified variables and they put in a call for researchers to develop more 
comprehensive research models that will have greater power in explaining and 
understanding this phenomenon.  Many academics have encouraged additional research 
on studying factors that influence M&A success (e.g.: Homburg and Bucerius, 2005; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2002).  To identify these unspecified 
variables alluded to by King et al. (2004); this dissertation examines integration processes 
of large mergers of similar sized firms that are competing within the same industry where 
the market has deemed the merger to be synergistic.  A M&A is considered to be 
synergistic if the market had a positive reaction to the M&A announcement 
(Markelevich, 2003; Seth, 1990; Seth, Song and Pettit, 2002).   
The purpose of this study is to examine pre-merger management team power 
characteristics of both the acquiring and target firms with the retention of power in the 
post-merger firm to determine if the M&A was able to increase the power retention in the 
resulting firm.  It also investigates the moderating role of organizational slack on this 
relationship as Gary (2005) found that even when synergy opportunities exist, the 
absence of slack will destroy value due to insufficient attention to merger implementation 
issues.  Another purpose is to examine the relationship between power retention in the 
post-merger firm with merger effectiveness. 
The general research model (Figure 1) guides the literature review and subsequent 
hypotheses development.  The discussion is divided into seven sections.  The first section 
addresses the importance of knowledge transfer within a M&A and how the acquisition 
 12
of new competencies can provide the organization with a sustainable competitive 
advantage.  The second section introduces the history and importance of merger and 
acquisition integration and how integration processes affect the outcome of the merger.  
The third section discusses the link between TMT characteristics and merger 
effectiveness.  This third section is broken into three subsections based on the focus of 
the research.  The first sub-section examines research where the focus is on the acquiring 
firm, the second where the focus is on the target firm and the final sub-section addresses 
research where the focus is on the post acquisition firm.  The fourth section investigates 
CEO and TMT power and concludes with an examination of research of these variables 
within the area of mergers and acquisitions.  Within the context of M&A’s, the fifth 
section discusses research conducted on the contextual variable of organizational slack.  
The sixth section focuses on merger effectiveness outcomes and the final section 
introduces the hypotheses.  
M&A Knowledge Transfer 
 
To sustain a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) within their 
industries, many organizations, that rely on intellectual capital, compete on their ability to 
utilize knowledge (Nonaka, 1994; Westphal and Shaw, 2005).  Researchers have found 
that as human capital is leveraged, performance increases (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and 
Kochhar, 2001).  The more competitive firms not only have the ability to generate and 
store information (Grant, 1996), but they integrate this information to create new 
knowledge and skills (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Spender, 1996; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997).  In their examination of multinational corporations, Kogut and Zander (1993) 
concluded that firms prosper based on their ability to transfer critical knowledge from 
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one group within their corporation to another.  This knowledge is embedded in the people 
and it is also embedded within the organization’s network of relationships and routines 
(Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Burt, 1992; Hansen, 1999).   
Organizations can attempt to develop these competencies on their own or they can 
attempt to acquire them through merger or acquisition activities.  The major problem in 
attempting to develop these skills internally is that these types of skills are embedded in 
the people and the network of relationships and may take years to develop.  Barney 
(1991) found that organizations that have these competencies have a resource that is 
“sticky” and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991).  With the competition that exists, 
organizations may not have the time to develop these skills (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991) because even if they are successful in accomplishing this task, they may still be 
behind their competition, as their competitors, to retain their competitive advantage, may 
have enhanced their skills and competencies.  Consequently some organizations have 
attempted to obtain these key resources and competencies from other organizations 
through M&As (Gulati, 1995; Singh and Montgomery, 1987).  This may be one of the 
reasons why Callahan (2004) found that in high technology industries, organizations that 
did not engage in acquisition activities were left behind in terms of growth and 
profitability.  Contrary to previous research findings, she found a strong positive 
relationship between acquisition activity and firm growth in gross profit.  In addition, she 
discovered that a firm would be less likely to survive if they failed to engage in mergers 
and acquisitions.   
Since each firm is unique, the combining of two firms requires a great deal of 
communication, consensus and compromise.  For a merger to be beneficial and 
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positioned to obtain the benefits the acquiring managers are hoping to gain, processes 
need to be put in place that will facilitate knowledge transfer from both the acquiring and 
target firms to the resultant post-merger firm.  
This transfer of knowledge requires attention to both strategic fit and 
organizational fit (Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Ranft and Lord, 2002).  Strategic fit  
(also referred to as strategic choice) is the fit between the two organizations and refers to 
the viability, complementary and verity of the intended merger (Hayward, 2002; 
Kitching, 1967; Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin, 1983); whereas organizational fit (often 
referred to as acquisition integration) is defined as the processes used by the acquiring 
company to “extract the gains associated with the combination of the two organizations” 
(Zollo and Singh, 2004: 1235).  While strategic fit is a necessary condition it is not 
sufficient in determining acquisition performance (Datta, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986).  In addition to addressing strategic fit, researchers are advocating that acquiring 
managers must also focus on organizational fit (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Shrivastava, 1986). 
Merger and Acquisition Integration (Organizational Fit) 
 
The importance of organizational integration has been addressed by such authors 
as Chandler (1962), Kitching (1967), and Leighton and Todd (1969) however, according 
to Dess et al. (1995); it is still being largely overlooked.  Jemison and Sitkin’s (1986) 
seminal article moved the focus away from examining specific issues to a more holistic 
view of organizational integration.  Even though, researchers have found that 
performance was enhanced when firms concentrated on integration processes (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004), this area has not been studied thoroughly 
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(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 
1988; Ranft and Lord, 2002). 
Prior to 1986, the majority of studies of fit addressed strategic choice with fewer 
studies addressing organizational integration (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).  The latter is 
complicated because it involves the meshing of people and culture from different 
organizations into a single unit (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988).  According to 
Shrivastava, (1986), organizational integration is one of the most critical issues that 
acquiring managers must address to facilitate an effective M&A.  However integration 
should not be considered separately but as part of the whole M&A process as the 
effectiveness of the resultant post-merger firm will be affected by the outcome of 
previous stages of the merger process (Hunt, 1990).  If these stages, such as target 
selection and bid negotiation, were inappropriately handled, it would make the 
implementation much more difficult.  Hunt (1990) concludes that the key to a successful 
merger is handling the behavioral processes in each of the stages from target selection, 
bidding, implementation through to the integration of the target staff into the post-merger 
firm.  
Shrivastava (1986) identified three levels of integration that managers need to 
address in relation to the post acquisition firm.  1) procedural, 2) physical and, 
 3) managerial and sociocultural.  The first two have been discussed in the literature 
(Hayward, 2002; Krishnan, Miller and Judge, 1997; Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy, 2003; Walsh 
and Ellwood, 1991; Zollo and Singh, 2004), but the third level, managerial and 
sociocultural, has received less attention.  When addressing organizational integration, 
one of the more critical issues is how to blend the various cultures and subcultures of the 
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two organizations – this is sometimes described as acculturation (Larsson and Lubatkin, 
2001).  It requires the ability to anticipate the types of concerns employees may have in 
relation to potential job loss and demotion, as well as the skill to put in place processes 
that can address these concerns (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Shrivastava,  1986).  Nearly two decades after 
Shrivastava’s work, Stahl (2004) substantiated these findings when he concluded that the 
main reason that mergers and acquisitions fail is not because of poor strategic fit, but 
rather because of inadequate attention to the execution of the merger.  Zollo and Singh 
(2004) further supported this view when they concluded that the level of effort focused 
on the integration processes to merge the two firms positively improved post-acquisition 
performance.  
Most studies have only examined integration at the business level.  Homburg and 
Bucerius (2005) were among the first researchers to investigate integration at the 
functional level.  Their research indicated that merger success is greatly enhanced when 
attention is given to how the various functional departments are integrated.  For the 
acquiring organization to gain the competencies it desires, it is important to understand 
one’s own competencies at a functional level and the complementary, idiosyncratic 
competencies of the target firm that one is attempting to acquire (Harrison et al., 1991; 
Westphal and Shaw, 2005; Westphal and Zajac, 1995).  These competencies are not only 
embedded in the people (Becker, 1962; Grant, 1996; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992), but are also embedded in the network of relationships (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Kiessling and Richey, 2005).  Consequently, unless implementation is 
appropriately addressed and executed the tacit knowledge and socially complex 
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relationships the acquiring firm wants to obtain may not survive the merger process 
(Ranft and Lord, 2002).   
Even though a number of academics have examined organizational integration 
(Pablo, 1994; Zollo and Singh, 2004), fewer studies have examined executive and TMT 
influences in relation to organizational integration (Abetti, 2006; Datta, 1991; Gadiesh, 
Buchanan, Daniell and Ormiston, 2002; Gadiesh, Ormiston and Rovit, 2003; Goh, 2001; 
Vester, 2002).  This is a critical area as the characteristics of the respective pre-merger 
top management teams can have a great deal of impact on the resultant post-merger firm 
(Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1992; Norburn and Birley, 1988; Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992) consequently; it is discussed in depth within the next section.    
Top Management Team Characteristics 
 
Song (1982) found support for the argument that a CEO’s prior background and 
experience is significantly associated with the level of diversification that (s)he is willing 
to undertake.  Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal article is credited with encouraging 
academics to focus their research efforts on senior management.  The focus on the CEO 
and the TMT is important as these individuals influence all other levels of the 
organization (Weber, 1996), they shape the culture of the organization (Chatterjee et al., 
1992; Schein, 1985) and organizations take on the characteristics of their top managers 
(Hambrick, 1989; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  The choices made by senior executives 
are a reflection of the values and cognitions of the TMT members individually and as a 
team (Cyert and March, 1963).    
Proxies such as functional background, age, tenure in position, education etc. 
have been used to tap into the cognitive base of the senior executives (Norburn and 
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Birley, 1988; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and to examine the relationship between these 
characteristics and a desired performance outcome.  Support has been found on the 
linkage of the demographic influences of the top management team characteristics to 
profitability (Norburn and Birley, 1988), strategy (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; 
Jensen and Zajac, 2004), competitive moves (Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996), 
innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), strategic consensus (Knight, Pearce, Smith, Olian, 
Sims, Smith and Flood, 1999) and diversification (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
There is strong empirical support that the functional background of the top 
management team and the CEO coupled with their strategic preferences and experiences 
can affect acquisition activities (Finkelstein, 1992; Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Palmer and 
Barber, 2001; Song 1982; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  The rest of this literature review 
is divided into three subsections.  The first addresses research where the focus is on the 
acquiring firm, the second where the focus is on the target firm and the final subsection 
where the focus is on the post-acquisition firm. 
Top Management Team Pre-merger Characteristics of Acquiring Firms  
Empirical research has shown that CEO and TMT characteristics such as age, 
tenure, education and work experience have a large influence on the level of 
diversification (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), accuracy of target firm evaluations (Hitt 
and Tyler, 1991), and the effectiveness of merger outcomes (Davis, 1968; Kitching, 
1967; Weber, 1996).  Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found that organizations that engaged 
in higher levels of diversification were characterized by CEO and TMT members that 
were younger, with more heterogeneity of functional education, and shorter 
organizational tenure.  Later studies attempted to understand whether functional 
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background of the acquiring TMT members would have an influence on the TMT’s 
propensity to undertake diversification activities (Jensen and Zajac, 2004).  These authors 
found that finance weighted TMTs are more likely to engage in a merger or acquisition.  
They also found that finance CEOs have a higher propensity to engage in merger 
activities than their non-financial counterparts. 
  Chatterjee et al. (1992) in their empirical review of TMT influences on 
synergistic mergers found evidence that the change in acquiring firm shareholder value is 
inversely related to the perceived cultural differences between the acquiring and target 
firms.  They conclude that investors are skeptical about announced mergers where the top 
management teams of the two firms appear to be incompatible.  These authors findings 
were replicated by Weber (1996), but he also found that the higher the level of 
commitment of the acquiring team the higher the post-merger effectiveness.  He 
concluded by cautioning future researchers that the dynamics between the acquiring firm 
and target firm progresses and can change from one set of dynamics to a completely 
different set as the merger evolves (Weber, 1996).  Hence, it is not only important to 
meet the expressed requirements of each of the firms at the time of announcement, but is 
also important to understand and meet any emerging needs (Ariño, 2003; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1999).  The examination of TMT characteristics of both the acquiring and target 
firm can provide explanatory power on merger effectiveness. 
Top Management Team Pre-merger Characteristics of Target Firms 
The majority of studies in the M&A literature have focused on the acquiring firm 
with negligible focus on the target firm (Graebner, 2004; Graebner and Eisenhardt, 
2004).  Graebner (2004) and Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) moved the focus to the 
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target firm and found that success after a merger is largely dependent on the involvement 
of target firm managers in the implementation process.  The resultant combined post-
merger firm exceeded their expected value when target management took an active role 
in maintaining integration momentum and in mitigating target employee returns.  When 
target executives were actively involved, in addition to creating the expected value, 
serendipitous value was created as well (Graebner, 2004).  Graebner (2004) described 
serendipitous values as unexpected synergies that were implemented that were not 
originally identified.  She found that the target managers were able to provide a better 
understanding of how their firm’s competencies could be interrelated to the target firm’s 
competencies and how these could be effectively integrated.  In addition, the involvement 
of the target managers provided a much higher level of comfort for target firm employees 
as they were able to anticipate and resolve potential conflicts on a more timely basis thus 
minimizing the concerns that exist whenever M&A occur.  This results in the retention of 
key employees and key knowledge in the resultant post-acquisition firm.  Graebner and 
Eisenhardt (2004) recommend that acquiring managers undertake a merger as a courtship. 
Top Management Team Post-merger Characteristics of Combined Firms 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s a number of researchers moved the focus of 
research away from the acquiring firm to the post acquisition firm (Datta, 1991; Seth, 
1990; Walsh, 1988).  Walsh (1988) found that the turnover of target managers was higher 
during M&A than what one might normally expect if the firms did not merge.  Krug 
(2003) confirmed that the rate of departure of target executives was three times higher 
than normal departure rates and after five years only thirty percent of target executives 
still remain with the post-merger organization (Krug and Aguilera, 2005).  Datta (1991) 
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found that differences in the top management team characteristics between the acquiring 
and target firm had a negative impact on performance of the post-merger firm.  Later 
authors found that what is important was not organizations and top management teams 
that are similar, but rather teams that can complement one another (Harrison et al., 1991; 
Krishnan et al., 1997).  To understand organizational fit and to determine if it was 
accomplished, the researchers need to not only examine the acquiring firm’s actions, but 
also the post-acquisition firm.  To bring about an effective implementation it is important 
that the top management teams are similar enough to understand one another, but diverse 
enough that they bring different competencies to the table.  So even though Datta (1991) 
found that differences had a negative impact on performance, later authors found that the 
ideal mergers were those in which the target firm is neither too dissimilar nor too similar 
(Harrison et al., 1991; Westphal and Shaw, 2005)   
Researchers are using the post-acquisition firm to determine the type of actions 
that may be beneficial to enhance the successful outcome of a merger.  As an example, 
Capron (1999) found that following a related acquisition, long-term performance is 
increased if the acquiring firm’s assets are divested rather than the target firm assets.  He 
also found that to obtain the improved revenue enhancing opportunities it is important 
that the acquiring firm’s resources should be redeployed to the target and the target firm 
resources need to be redeployed to the acquiring firm.  Within the field of human 
resource management, researchers have determined that the successful execution of the 
post-acquisition merger is dependent on the socialization processes that have been put in 
place among employees across the two firms (Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001).  These 
socialization processes address such questions as: Has the role of individuals from both 
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the acquiring and target firm been ironed out yet? Are the employees of each firm getting 
together to know each other better? What will be the resultant culture?  Is it the culture of 
the acquiring firm or is it a mixture of each firm? 
Top Management Team Power Characteristics 
 
The majority of researchers investigating the influence of senior management on 
merger effectiveness have attempted to explain it through the use of individual TMT 
characteristics.  Even though individual TMT measures such as age, tenure as CEO, 
tenure in the organization and education provide some explanation (Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992), composite measures have a larger ability to capture the construct of 
interest (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982; Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001; Chakravarthy, 1986).  
Hitt and Tyler (1991) in their study were unable to find a statistically significant 
relationship when they attempted to examine the relationship between TMT age and their 
dependent variable of target evaluations.  They had similar results when they examined 
the relationship between the single TMT variable of “work experience” and target firm 
evaluations.  However, when they created a new variable that combined both age and 
work experience, they were able to detect a statistically significant relationship.  This 
brings additional credence to the importance of having variables that are derived from 
more than one measure.  
Finkelstein (1992) introduced and tested for reliability and validity four different 
composite measures of power.  These measures were ownership power, structural power, 
prestige power, and expert power.  The first two are formal bases of power which are 
bestowed upon the individuals in light of their position within the organization or by the 
level of ownership in the organization.  Whereas, the latter two are informal sources of 
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power that are based on others perceptions of their ability to lead.  Previous research has 
shown that there is a direct positive relationship between CEO’s and TMT’s power and 
diversification activities (Finkelstein, 1992; Zajac and Westphal, 1996).  Hence a better 
understanding of the power dimensions and the impact they may have on merger 
performance would seem prudent.  The next few paragraphs define power and then 
provide explanations for each of these four power constructs. 
Power is defined as “the capacity of individual actors to exert their will” 
(Finkelstein, 1992: 506) or the “ability to bring about a preferred or intended effect” 
(Bigley and Wiersema, 2002: 707).  The benefits of power constructs are that they are 
multi-dimensional and combine several elements of TMT characteristics and thus they 
provide a better understanding than those that are based on a single variable 
(Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein, 2001; Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 
2000).  The use of these power constructs may have the potential to uncover some of the 
unidentified variables that King et al. (2004) encouraged researchers to investigate.  
Structural power is the power that has been bestowed upon the CEO and the top 
management team on the basis of their position in the organization (Brass, 1984; 
Hambrick, 1981).  The CEO is generally regarded as the most powerful actor within the 
organization (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Jensen and Zajac, 2004).  However, this power 
can become even greater if this individual holds other titles in the organization 
(Davidson, Worrell and Nemec, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 1994).  When the CEO holds 
the top two positions within the corporation, such as CEO and president and/or chief 
operating officer (COO), he/she has more formal authority to conduct business without 
having to obtain agreement and/or support from other senior executives (Bigley and 
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Wiersema, 2002; Daily and Johnson, 1997).  Power is even greater if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board of directors, as this provides him/her with power over other board 
members as well as additional power over the other officers and executives of the 
corporation (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Davidson et al., 1998).  Finally, the CEO is 
perceived to have the highest level of structural power when he/she holds all three titles - 
CEO, president and chairman of the board, as he/she is shielded from many of the 
monitoring activities within the corporation (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Davidson et al., 
1998).    
Ownership power is based on the percentage of the company that is owned by 
individuals within the corporation.  Executives who are also significant shareholders will 
have more power than executives who do not have an ownership position (Finkelstein, 
1992).  By virtue of their ownership position, these executives will be able to exert more 
power over the board of directors to accomplish their will.  Not only do they have power 
based on their structural position, but their power is increased because of their ownership 
position.   
Prestige power is the executive’s reputation within the organization and the 
industry (Finkelstein, 1992; Olson, 2004).  An executive that has graduated from a 
prestigious university and has been asked to serve on the board of a number of different 
companies is deemed to have a higher level of prestige power.  Other individuals look to 
them for their network of relationships and contacts.  According to D’Aveni (1990), the 
viability of a firm is dependent on the prestige of its managers as these individuals would 
be most likely to have powerful friends.  Prestige power has the potential to confer 
legitimacy on an organization” (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Krishnan and Park, 2003)  
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Expert power deals with an executive’s abilities to contribute to organizational 
success, and cope with corporation and environmental uncertainties (Finkelstein, 1992; 
Hambrick, 1981; Krishnan and Park, 2003; Olson, 2004).  It requires an ability to 
understand and appropriately react to factors that occur at both the organizational and 
industry level (Hambrick, 1981; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  Level of education, tenure 
within an organization along with tenure in a senior executive position can increase this 
type of power.  Individuals that have higher levels of expert power are not only known 
within the organization, but their advice may also be sought by individuals within the 
industry.  People will listen and follow these individuals not because of their structural 
position, but because they have confidence in their ability to lead.  
Very few studies have examined TMT power characteristics as they relate to 
mergers and acquisitions (D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993; Krishnan and Park, 2003).  A 
notable empirical exception is the study completed by D’Aveni and Kesner (1993).  They 
concluded that target managers would be more likely to cooperate if they shared ties to 
some of the same networks with the acquiring firm and had less prestigious connections.  
However, they found target managers would resist if the target managers felt they had 
more prestigious ties than the acquiring firm or if neither the acquiring nor the target 
firm’s TMT were highly connected.  Since an acquisition involves a complete change in 
structural hierarchy and ownership, D’Aveni and Kesner (1993) only addressed prestige 
and expert power.  However, in this dissertation, in addition to collecting data on prestige 
and expert power, data on CEO structural power will also be collected. 
Krishnan and Park (2003) theorized that the greater the prestige and expert power 
in the target firm, the higher the post-acquisition performance.  They proposed that target 
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managers with expert power would be valuable to the post-merger firm because with 
their heterogeneous background they bring a new set of competencies to the top 
management team that may generate different and unique alternatives to key issues 
(Krishnan and Park, 2003).  These authors suggested that retention of prestige power 
from target executives would be advantageous to the post-merger firm because of the 
access to different social networks, and increased trust from major stakeholders and 
employees.  
Organizational Slack 
 
Slack has been defined in different ways.  Cyert and March (1963: 54) define it as 
“the supply of uncommitted resources”.  Cohen, March and Olsen (1972:12) had a fairly 
similar definition when they defined it as “the difference between the resources of the 
organization and the combination of demands made on it.”  According to Bourgeois 
(1981: 30) the most common definition used within the academic literature is 
“organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an 
organization to adapt successfully to internal and external pressures.”  Researchers have 
examined the relationship of slack to a variety of performance outcomes such as market 
expansion (Mishina, Pollock and Porac, 2004), product expansion (Mishina, Pollock and 
Porac, 2004), innovation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), environmental uncertainty 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Lawson, 2001) and mergers and acquisitions (Gary, 2005). 
One of the purposes of slack was to induce employees to stay with an 
organization by paying them more than what the market might dictate (Cyert and March, 
1963).  Another benefit of slack is it may also allow subunits to pursue goals that may not 
be essential, but in the long-run could lead to opportunities (Bourgeois, 1981; Geiger and 
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Cashen, 2002).  A third benefit is it allows an organization to adapt to complex 
technologies and environmental turbulence (Cyert and March, 1963; Lawson, 2001).  
Fourth, it provides a cushion for individuals within an organization to adapt to 
discontinuities, in the organizational environment (Bourgeois, 1981; Thompson, 1967).  
The examination of slack during a merger implementation is warranted because the 
disruptions in individual’s routines are one of the greatest discontinuities’ that individuals 
within the two merging entities face.  In relation to M&A, one of the few studies that 
investigated slack as a moderator variable was completed by Gary (2005).  He found that 
negative performance outcomes result when there is insufficient slack and that 
maintaining organizational slack through all aspects of the M&A process is essential. 
The typical typology used by researchers to distinguish between the various types 
of organizational slack is 1) available slack, 2) recoverable slack, and 3) potential slack 
(Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Herold, Jayaraman and Narayanaswamy, 2006; Sharfman, 
Wolf, Chase and Tansik, 1988).  Available slack represents resources available, 
recoverable slack is the existing resources within an organization that can be reallocated 
and potential slack identifies the firm’s ability to generate new resources.  Other names 
for available and recoverable slack are unabsorbed and absorbed slack (Singh,1986).  
However, this typology only addresses various types of financial slack.  Financial slack 
gives an organization the wherewithal to invest in a new venture and human resource 
slack provides the expertise and time to be able to integrate the two organizations.  The 
acquiring organization requires financial slack because without this slack they would not 
have the monetary resources to engage in the merger in the first place (Nohria and Gulati, 
1996; Singh, 1986). 
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In addition to examining financial slack, Mishina et al., (2004) encouraged 
researchers to also investigate human resource slack as each of these types of slack can 
have different effects on post-merger performance.  These authors are some of the few 
that ventured away from the typology mentioned above and attempted to examine and 
measure human resource slack.  In their study they found that human resource slack 
positively moderated the relationship between market expansion and sales growth, 
whereas financial slack did not have an impact on this relationship.  A synergistic merger 
expands the scope of a firm and consequently, some of the same competencies that 
provide benefits in the market expansion to sales growth relationship may be evident 
during the merger integration process.  
The combining of two firms requires a great deal of communication, consensus 
and compromise (Graebner, 2004; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Westphal and 
Shaw, 2005) and the re-deployment of human resource slack within the pre-acquiring 
firms to be utilized in the acquisition implementation process can positively affect the 
retention of desired competencies and resources (Barney, 1991; Larsson and Lubatkin, 
2001; Ranft and Lord, 2002).  Firms prosper on their ability to transfer critical knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993).  Research has found that as human capital is leveraged, 
performance increases (Hitt et al., 2001).  This human resource slack can be utilized to 
initiate and facilitate communication between the pre-acquisition firms, it can be also be 
utilized to alleviate fears that may arise due to potential job loss or a change in task 
responsibilities.  Graebner (2004) found that the utilization of resources from the target 
corporation in the implementation process can generate serendipitous values, which she 
defined as unexpected synergies that were not initially identified.   
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The utilization of human resource slack resources from the acquiring and target 
firm can be utilized in the acquisition implementation process.  The merger 
implementation team, which contains representatives from each pre-merger firm, can 
work together to orchestrate a smoother merger and resolve potential issues.  
Merger Effectiveness Outcomes 
 
One reason for equivocal findings within the merger and acquisition literature is 
the lens by which performance is measured.  The majority of the early research on M&A 
performance concentrated on strategic fit to ascertain the viability of the merger and 
ignored organizational fit (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001).  
Within the last couple of decades, researchers have transferred some of their focus to the 
examination of organizational fit and/or acquisition integration (Pablo, 1994).  
However, even within the acquisition integration stream of research, there has 
been three separate lenses by which performance has been measured.  The majority of the 
research has focused on the acquiring organization, with some more recent studies 
examining performance based on the post-merger firm and only a few authors addressing 
performance through the lens of the target organization.  Seth (1990) expanded on the 
contradictory findings on performance issues concluded that one reason the results were 
ambivalent is that the focus was on either the acquiring and/or target firm instead of the 
combined entity.  She recommends that value is created “when the value of the combined 
entity exceeds the sum of the values of the two combining firms” (Seth, 1990: 107).   
This dissertation examines performance through the lens of the post-acquisition firm.   
Chakravarthy (1986) observed that many of the accounting based performance 
measures used by researchers failed to capture the variable the researchers was 
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attempting to measure as it only captured one dimension of the firm’s strategy.  
Consequently, in this dissertation, post-merger firm performance is measured using two 
distinct measures (Chakravarthy, 1986; Venkatraman and Grant, 1986).  First it is 
measured using the accounting based measure of return on assets which is a measure that 
is frequently used by strategy researchers (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Harrison et al., 
1991, Krishnan et al., 1997) to evaluate strategic actions.  Secondly it is measured using 
the stock based measure of Jensen’s alpha which compares the post-merger firm 
performance to that of firms of similar risk (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Daily and 
Johnson, 1997).   
Hypotheses 
 
Building on the literature review articulated in the sections above, it is expected 
that CEO and TMT power structures of the acquiring and target firm along with the 
contextual variables of financial and human resource slack will be related to the 
effectiveness of the merger outcome.  This section will introduce the hypotheses that 
emerge from the research model (See Figure 1).  First it will address post-merger firm 
performance and examine the relationship between target executive retention and post-
acquisition performance.  Second, it will investigate CEO and TMT power characteristics 
of the managers in the pre and post-merger firms to determine the impact these 
dimensions may have on the phenomena of mergers and acquisitions.  It will compare the 
resultant post-acquisition power characteristics with that of the pre-merger acquiring and 
target firm’s power levels to ascertain whether the relative power increased or decreased 
and will measure the impact of the change in power on overall post-merger firm 
performance.  Finally, it will introduce moderators such as financial slack and human 
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resource slack and will investigate the impact these variables have on overall post–
acquisition firm performance. 
Target Executive Turnover and Performance of Post-merger Firm 
Within the strategy literature, one reason given for M&A activity is to acquire 
resources and/or competencies (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Hayward, 2002) that can allow 
the organization to create and sustain a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984).  This acquisition activity is intended develop synergies and create economic value 
(Harrison et al., 1991).  These competencies and resources are often embedded within the 
people, yet prior research has found evidence that turnover among target managers was 
significantly higher in the event of a merger than normal turnover rates (Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Krug, 2003; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988).  Other authors 
have found evidence that the minimization of target executive turnover increases post 
acquisition performance (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997; Walsh, 
1988; Zollo and Singh, 2004).   
Since post-merger firm performance decreases as turnover of target managers 
increases, it is essential to implement processes that will minimize this drain as these 
individuals are not easily replaceable (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Krug, 2003; Walsh, 
1988).  It is especially problematic when target executives, with resources and 
competencies that acquiring firm was anticipating receiving, decide not to participate in 
the post-merger firm.  This can result in the loss of synergies and may ultimately result in 
a competitive disadvantage if these executives move to a competing firm.   
One key process that must be effectively managed is how the firms are integrated.  
Zollo and Singh (2004) found that the greater the level of integration between the two 
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merged firms the higher the potential post-acquisition performance.  The retention of 
knowledge from both pre-acquisition firms and the creation of new knowledge become 
essential for a firm to obtain the competencies and skills it was hoping to acquire 
(Hansen, 1999; Kogut and Zander, 1993).  Since knowledge is embedded within the 
people (Grant, 1996) and network of relationships (Burt, 1992; Hansen, 1999), the 
acquiring management team needs to have a good understanding of the skills that exist 
within the target firm and the potential that they have to retain those skills (Buchholtz, 
Ribbens and Houle, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1990; Krug and Hegarty, 2001).   
They need to comprehend the complementary skills of the target company (Hayward, 
2002; Krishnan et al., 1997; Westphal and Shaw, 2005), understand where these skills 
reside and put in place an integration strategy that will minimize the turnover of the target 
executives they desire to retain.  This type of action requires extensive cooperation (Park 
and Russo, 1996) on the part of both the acquiring and target companies where the target 
executive is an active member in coordinating the merger and in alleviating downsizing 
fears of the target managers (Graebner, 2004).  To obtain the value the acquiring firm is 
expecting and to utilize learning to obtain a competitive advantage, it is essential that 
turnover of managers and executives is minimized (Hatch and Dyer, 2004). 
H1: In synergistic M&As, the higher the target executive retention, 
the greater the post-acquisition firm performance. 
Expert and Prestige Power 
Turnover of target executives does not provide the whole story as it doesn’t 
differentiate between executives the acquiring firm desired to retain versus those that did 
not provide a synergistic benefit to the post-merger organization.  The utilization of 
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constructs such as prestige and expert power can help identify a target executive’s core 
competencies and his/her abilities to manage a firm (D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 1992).  One of the objectives of this research is to examine the 
acquiring and target CEO and TMT pre-merger power structures and compare that with 
the structure of the post-acquisition team to determine whether the post-merger firm was 
able to increase its level of prestige and expert power from that of the pre-acquisition 
firm.  Target executives with more prestige may have larger social networks that can be 
of great value in identifying potential profitable business opportunities.  They may also 
have “sticky” resources and skills (Barney, 1991) that can complement the skills that the 
acquisition firm previously possessed.   
Consequently an acquiring firm may undertake a M&A to increase its prestige 
and expert power as the executives within this firm feel this is the type of resource that 
can provide the organization with a sustainable competitive advantage.  If the acquiring 
organization is successful in retaining these skills, the post-acquisition firm should have a 
higher level of prestige and expert power than pre-acquisition acquiring firm.  Therefore, 
it is hypothesized that: 
H2A In synergistic M&As, the greater the increase in prestige power 
of the post-acquisition firm over the pre-acquisition prestige 
power of the acquiring firm, the greater the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
H2B In synergistic M&A, the greater the increase in expert power of 
the post-acquisition combined firm over the pre-acquisition expert 
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power of the acquiring firm, the greater the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
Another area that will be investigated is the level of both prestige and expert 
power in the pre-acquisition acquiring and target firms as an imbalance in this area may 
cause complications for the implementation.  CEO’s and top management teams in large 
organizations that have achieved that level of structural power for the most part have 
large egos and are proud of their accomplishments and would not like to diminish their 
perceived level of prestige or expertness by being taking over by a firm that is perceived 
to be inferior.  D’Aveni and Kesner (1993) found that target managers were more prone 
to cooperate with the merger if they perceived the acquiring firm had more prestigious 
connections.  Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber (1999) found that the retention of target 
executives is dependent on their relative standing.  If the target executive feels that 
his/her position will be considerably lower in the new organization than he/she was 
accustomed to, then the executive is apt to leave the newly combined post-acquisition 
firm.  Thus it is hypothesized: 
H3A: In synergistic M&As, the greater (lesser) the prestige power of 
the acquiring firm TMT over the prestige power of the target firm 
TMT, the greater (lower) the target executive retention.  
H3B: In synergistic M&As, the greater (lesser) the expert power of 
the acquiring firm TMT over the expert power of the target firm 
TMT, the greater (lower) the target executive retention.  
As mentioned earlier one of the reasons why an acquiring firm may be interested 
in a target firm is to increase their level of prestige and expert power.  However, 
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problems can arise if the target firm perceives that they have a higher level of expert 
and/or prestige power than that of the acquiring firm.  To alleviate these concerns, the 
target executives could be given a significant role on the acquisition implementation 
team.  This provides evidence that the post-merger firm is interested in retaining their 
skills and competencies and has the added benefit of providing key individuals in the 
target organization that are available to alleviate fears of other management and staff 
within the target organization.  These individuals can also be utilized not only in the 
continued management of the target firm (Graebner, 2004), but also in the acquirer’s 
business activities.  
H4A: When the target firm TMT has a higher level of prestige power 
than that of the acquiring firm, the greater the percentage of 
target executives on the post-acquisition top management team, 
the greater the post-acquisition firm performance. 
H4B: When the target firm TMT has a higher level of expert power 
than that of the acquiring firm, the greater the percentage of 
target executives on the post-acquisition top management team, 
the greater the post-acquisition firm performance. 
CEO Structural Power 
Since the CEO is the most powerful actor in the organization (Daily and Johnson, 
1997; Jensen and Zajac, 2004), structural power will be based on the structural power of 
the CEO and hereafter will be named CEO structural power.  A CEO is deemed to have a 
higher level of structural power if he/she has additional titles.  It is anticipated that if the 
CEO relinquishes some of his/her structural power to a member of the target company, 
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that this strongly indicates a mutually beneficial M&A and a desire to retain resources 
and capabilities from the target firm.  For example, if the CEO of the acquiring firm prior 
to the M&A was also the chairman of the board and/or the president of the organization 
and (s)he relinquishes one of his/her titles to a member of the target firm, this would 
indicate a strong desire to retain the capabilities of the target company.  
H5A In synergistic M&As, a decrease in CEO structural power of the 
post-acquisition firm over the CEO structural power in the pre-
acquisition acquiring firm, will result in higher target executive 
retention. 
H5B In synergistic M&As, a decrease in CEO structural power of the 
post-acquisition firm over the CEO structural power in the pre-
acquisition acquiring firm, will result in higher post-acquisition 
firm performance. 
Now that the main effect relationships have been discussed, the moderator variables of 
financial and human resource slack will be introduced. 
Organizational Slack (Financial and Human Resource Slack) 
The effective integration of two organizations requires a substantial commitment 
of financial and human resources (Gary, 2005; Graebner, 2004; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991).  Organizational slack, which is defined as the difference between resources that 
the firm possesses and the resources required to run the business, has been considered a 
necessary requirement in implementing diversification initiatives (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Chakravarthy, 1986; Gary, 2005; Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  There are two main types of 
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organizational slack, one is financial slack and the other is human resource slack 
(Mishina et al., 2004).  
Financial slack allows an organization to take advantage of opportunities that 
present themselves in the environment (Mishina et al., 2004).  It provides the 
organization with the skills and dollars to not only appropriately evaluate a new merger 
opportunity, but also provides them with the wherewithal to invest in the new venture.  
Financial slack can also be utilized in assigning resources to facilitate the integration of 
the two organizations.   
One of the purposes of the merger is to obtain “sticky” resources and 
competencies from the target organization (Barney, 1991) that are difficult to develop 
internally.  If the post-merger firm is able to retain their existing powerful executives and 
also secure the services of target executives with a high level of prestige and/or expert 
power, the resultant post-merger firm will have a higher level of retained power.  A 
deficit in acquisition firm financial slack hinders the organizations abilities to effectively 
combine the two entities and acquire the competencies from the target organization it is 
striving to obtain (Gary, 2005).  Whereas, the retention of financial slack through all the 
stages of the merger implementation (Gary, 2005) may assist the organization to manage 
the integration to provide opportunities for the acquiring company to obtain the 
competencies it had anticipated receiving.  
H6A: Acquiring firm financial slack will moderate the relationship between 
target firm prestige power and post-merger firm prestige power retention 
such that as acquiring firm financial slack increases, the relationship 
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between target firm prestige power and post-merger prestige power 
retention is strengthened. 
H6B: Acquiring firm financial slack will moderate the relationship between 
target firm expert power and post-merger firm expert power retention 
such that as acquiring firm financial slack increases, the relationship 
between target firm expert power and post-merger expert power 
retention is strengthened. 
Once financial slack requirement is satisfied, human resource (HR) slack becomes 
critical.  It is the management of this human resource slack within the two organizations 
that can greatly affect the outcome of the merger.  Prior research often looks at an 
acquisition as an process that exists within the acquiring firm (Kitching, 1967; Pablo, 
1994) and the involvement of the target managerial team is often overlooked (Graebner, 
2004).  It is important that HR slack exists in at least one of the organizations and that the 
organizations appropriately utilize these slack resources in the implementation process.  
In examining human resource slack four scenarios exist: 
1. Slack may be high in the acquiring firm and low in the target firm. 
2. Slack may be low in the acquiring firm and high in the target firm. 
3. Slack may be low in both firms. 
4. Slack may be high in both firms. 
In the first scenario the acquiring firm has a high level of HR slack while the 
target firm has a low level.  To appropriately integrate the two organizations, it may be 
wise for the acquiring company to lend some of their staff for the day-to-day running of 
the target business.  This action has a three-fold benefit.  First, it provides the opportunity 
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for the post-acquisition firm to earn abnormal returns as Capron and Pistre (2002) found 
that it is the transfer of acquiring firm resources to the target firm line of business that 
generates superior returns.  Second, it facilitates learning, as the involvement of acquiring 
managers within the target business allows tacit knowledge embedded within the target 
firm to be transferred to the acquiring firm.  Hatch and Dyer (2004) found evidence that 
this learning is an essential step in securing some of the resources and competencies the 
acquiring firm requires to obtain and/or retain a sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  Third, it frees up some key target managerial staff to assist in the 
implementation.  Graebner (2004) found that the utilization of the target management to 
assist in the implementation can provide the merger not only with the values they were 
expecting to obtain, but also provide them with serendipitous value.  Graebner (2004) 
described serendipitous values as unexpected synergies that were implemented that were 
not originally identified.  In the mergers she examined, she found that when the target 
managers had a key role during the implementation, the post-merger results were much 
more positive.  These managers have a relationship with the staff in the target firm and 
not only know how the firms could be merged, but can also communicate with their staff 
to alleviate fears, thus providing a higher degree of probability that key leaders will be 
retained in the post-merger firm. 
If the acquiring firm has a low level of HR slack, while the target firm has a high 
level of HR slack, then the target managers should take a lead role in the implementation 
with some assistance from the acquiring firm.  If the acquiring firm does not have HR 
slack, to ensure the involvement of individuals from the acquiring firm, some of the slack 
resources from the target company could be re-deployed to the acquiring firm to assist in 
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the running of their day-to-day operations.  This would free up individuals from the 
acquiring organization to dedicate time on merger implementation activities.  
The worst scenario is that slack resources do not exist in either the target or the 
acquiring company.  This type of situation does not lend itself to a successful merger 
implementation as the key activities will not be thought out and the implementation will 
be less than ideal and will be less likely to yield the expected benefits that acquiring 
management was hoping to achieve. 
The final scenario is where there is a high degree of slack in both the acquiring 
and target organizations.  To garner the expected benefits and perhaps some of the 
potential serendipitous benefits, the acquiring organization must not take total control but 
they will need to include target management as an equal partner (Graebner, 2004).   
The utilization of human resource slack resources from the acquiring and target 
firm can be utilized in the acquisition implementation process.  The merger 
implementation team, which contains representatives from each pre-merger firm, can 
then work together to orchestrate a smoother merger and resolve potential issues.  This in 
turn provides opportunities that a greater number of target individuals with high levels of 
prestige and expert power will be retained in the post-merger firm.  The essential item is 
that human resource slack must be available and the two companies that are merging 
must work together to solve issues and garner the benefits that each of them were hoping 
to achieve.   
H7A: Acquiring firm human resource slack will moderate the 
relationship between target firm prestige power and post-merger 
prestige power retention such that as acquiring firm human 
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resource slack increases, the relationship between target firm 
prestige power and post-merger prestige power retention is 
strengthened. 
H7B: Acquiring firm human resource slack will moderate the 
relationship between target firm expert power and post-merger 
expert power retention such that as acquiring firm human 
resource slack increases, the relationship between target firm 
expert power and post-merger expert power retention is 
strengthened. 
H7C: Target firm human resource slack will moderate the 
relationship between target firm prestige power and post-merger 
prestige power retention such that as target firm human resource 
slack increases, the relationship between target firm prestige 
power and post-merger prestige power retention is strengthened. 
H7D: Target firm human resource slack will moderate the 
relationship between target firm expert power and post-merger 
expert power retention such that as target firm human resource 
slack increases, the relationship between target firm expert power 
and post-merger expert power retention is strengthened. 
This chapter summarizes research related to the elements of the dissertation 
research model that was introduced in Chapter 1.  It also highlights the need to conduct 
additional research on pre-merger activities and integration activities that can increase the 
likelihood of a successful M&A.  It develops arguments linking pre-merger TMT power 
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characteristics such as prestige and expert power to post-merger effectiveness.  This 
section also develops hypotheses related to the dissertation model (Figure 1).  Chapter 3 
introduces the data sample and methodology that will be used to test these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodology that will be used to test the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.  The first section provides information on mergers 
and acquisitions used within this study and describe the criteria that will be used in 
selecting the merger sample.  The second section explains how the key constructs in the 
model will be operationalized.  The third section identifies the analytical techniques that 
will be used to empirically examine the research questions and the final section 
summarizes the hypotheses along with providing an overview of how each hypothesis 
will be measured and statistically tested.  
Sample Selection 
 
Publically traded US based firms acquisitions will be identified by the Mergerstat 
database.  The sample included in this study will meet the following criteria: 
1 The mergers were considered related. 
2 They were large mergers (minimum deal size of $1 billion).   
3 The acquiring and target firms were of similar size. 
4 The mergers were completed during the years 1995 – 2004. 
5 The mergers were defined as synergistic. 
Additional information on each of these criteria is described below: 
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Relatedness 
This dissertation is attempting to examine mergers that are made to obtain 
complementary skills and abilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Krishnan et al, 1997) that the 
acquiring firm does not currently possess.  Consequently, unrelated mergers are 
eliminated from the sample as the integration objectives and issues are very distinct 
between related and unrelated mergers (Ellis, 2000; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).    
Relatedness is a measure of the extent to which an acquiring firm's primary SIC 
code is similar to the target firm's primary SIC code.  Some scholars have classified a 
merger as related when the primary operations are in the same two-digit code (Chatterjee 
et al., 1992; Kroll et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 1999).  However, other researchers have 
imposed a more stringent coding where a perfect four-digit match between acquirer and 
target and is required before a merger is considered related (Buchholtz et al., 2003; 
Capron, 1999).  This match at the four digit level is often referred to as a horizontal 
merger (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  While a third group of researchers have 
classified a merger as related if there is a match in the two digit SIC code along with at 
least one match at the four-digit level within the acquiring and target firms’ top six lines 
of business (Ellis, 2000; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).   
Since, scholars have found support that acquisition performance is enhanced 
when the acquiring and target firm are neither too similar nor too dissimilar (Krishnan et 
al., 1997; Ramaswamy, 1997), rather than using the stringent four-digit SIC code match, 
this dissertation also includes mergers where there is a match at the two-digit primary 
SIC code and a four-digit match in one of the top six lines of business.  
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Size of Merger 
The average size of US mergers during 1997 was $209 million (Mergerstat, 1998) 
and this average remained virtually unchanged for the year 2004 and increased by twenty 
percent in 2005, when the average was recorded as $200 and $259 million respectively 
(Mergerstat, 2006).  An examination of these mergers completed during 2004 and 2005 
shows that many of these consist of smaller mergers and only five (5) percent of them 
represent mergers amounting to $1 billion or more (Mergerstat, 2006).  Since the research 
question in this dissertation requires the active involvement of the CEO and TMT of both 
the acquiring and target firm, a minimum cutoff value of $1 billion was selected (Ellis, 
2000; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997).  An examination of mergers of this magnitude will 
ensure that senior executives from each pre-merger organization are involved.  
Relative Size of Acquiring Firm versus the Target Firm 
Hambrick and Cannella (1993) found evidence that executives in small 
acquisitions seldom stay with the combined organization as their relative standing in the 
post-merger organization was significantly changed.  To observe the effects this study is 
attempting to detect (Ellis, 2000; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Hayward, 2002), this 
dissertation will limit its focus to examining firms of similar size.  
A commonly used measure of firm size within the strategic management literature 
is firm sales (Datta, 1991; Ellis, 2000; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Hayward, 2002; 
Kroll, et al., 1997).  A merger is considered of similar size when one of the pre-merger 
firms is no greater than twice the size the other (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989).  This is 
operationalized as “the ratio of the sales of the acquiring firm to that of the target firm” 
(Datta, 1991: 287) calculated on sales data taken during the year of the merger 
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announcement (Ellis, 2000: Hayward, 2002).  Mergers included in this study have ratios 
that fall between 0.5 to 2.0.   
Mergers Completed During the Years 1995 – 2004  
To evaluate performance, financial data is required two years before the merger 
and for at least one year after the merger.  The period from 1995 to 2004 was chosen as 
the period of analysis, as it provides recent merger data, the size and number of mergers 
has remained fairly constant during this time period (Mergerstat, 1998, 2006) and it 
provides at least one year of data to examine performance (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994).  Krishnan et al., 1997 measured post-merger firm performance three years after 
the year of the merger.  However, in large mergers, the performance observed may 
contain confounding variables.  Consequently, this study follows the convention of 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) by lagging performance by one year.  
Synergistic Merger  
A merger is considered to be synergistic if market place had a positive reaction to 
the merger announcement (Markelevich, 2003; Seth, 1990; Seth, Song and Pettit, 2002).  
This is indicated by an abnormal return generated at announcement date such that the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the acquiring plus target firms are positive 
(Markelevich, 2003; Seth, 1990).   
  Acquirer and target stock prices will be measured using the market value of the 
acquiring and target firm.  The most commonly used window for event studies is from 
five (5) trading days before the announcement to five (5) days after the announcement 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Markelevich, 2003), consequently, this is the time 
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frame that will be utilized within this dissertation.  However, since information on an 
intended merger may be leaked to stockholders prior to the announcement date, 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) will also be examined thirty (30) days prior to the 
announcement. 
To calculate abnormal returns, stock price reaction to the merger announcement 
using event study methodology will be utilized (Combs and Skill, 2003; Kroll et al., 
1997; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  This methodology is 
being utilized as it provides a well-grounded mechanism to link abnormal stock prices 
back to a specific event (Kroll et al., 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  The event 
study methodology has been extensively utilized within strategic management in 
examining market reactions to various events as stock prices are purported to contain 
stockholders assessment of the true value of the firm (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Combs and 
Skill, 2003; Davidson, Nemec, and Worrell, 2001; Kroll et al., 1997; Seth, 1990: Wright, 
Ferris, Hiller and Kroll, 1995).  According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997: 626-627), 
stock prices are “assumed to reflect the discounted value of all future cash flows and 
incorporate all relevant information.” 
Total CAR for the acquiring and target company will be measured by adding up 
the acquirer CAR and the target CAR.   
Measurement of Key Variables 
 
Since single-item scales do not adequately and accurately capture the concept 
being measured (Harrigan, 1983; Nunnally, 1978; Venkatraman and Grant, 1986), the 
majority of the variables within this study utilize constructs that are derived from more 
than one variable.  
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Independent Variables 
Data will be collected on all four types of power for each of the acquiring, target 
and post-merger firm.  How each of these are measured are shown in the subsequent 
sections. 
Jensen and Zajac (2004) recommended that to improve predictive significance 
future researchers should disaggregate the CEO from the rest of the management team.  
In their study when they examined the CEO separately from the rest of the top 
management team, they found a much stronger support for the demographic to 
diversification link.  As an example prior to previous notions these authors found support 
that TMT members with a similar functional background to the CEO will align 
themselves more closely with other TMT members from distinct functions than they will 
with their CEO who has the same functional background.  Consequently, for the 
remainder of this paper the term TMT will refer to all members of the top management 
team except the CEO.  The TMT will exclude the CEO but will include all other 
individuals above the level of vice-president who reported to the CEO and were also 
board members (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Krishnan et al., 1997).  This definition 
is consistent with what is used by other researchers (Krishnan et al., 1997; Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992) and may include executive positions such as president, chief operating 
officer, executive vice president, senior vice president, and chief financial officer. 
Prestige power  
Prestige power is the executive’s reputation within the industry environment 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Olson, 2004).  Finkelstein (1992) used three items to measure this 
dimension – elite education, founder status and the number of boards on which the 
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executive serves.  Elite education is determined by an executives’ graduation from a 
prestigious school (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Hitt et al., 2001; Olson, 
2004).  This dissertation will utilize the list developed by Finkelstein (1992) and that has 
been subsequently utilized by other researchers (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; D’Aveni 
and Kesner, 1993; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Olson, 2004).  A list of prestigious 
universities is shown in Appendix A.  The value for this measure ranges from 0 to 3 with 
higher values indicating higher levels of prestige.  This will be coded as 0 if no degree, as 
a 1 if no elite degree, as a 2 if one degree came from an elite institution and as a 3 if two 
or more degrees came from an elite institution.  This will be coded for the CEO and for 
TMT identified in the acquiring and target firms.  Data on this measure will be collected 
from Who’s Who in Finance and Industry, Dun and Bradstreet Reference Book of 
Corporate Management and Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors, 
and Executives. 
Founder status is the second dimension of prestige power.  Nelson (2003) found 
evidence that founders are more likely than non-founders to exercise strong strategic 
leadership and that the stock market reacts favorably to founder-led firms.  Other 
researchers have found evidence that relatives to founders also possess some of the same 
degree of power because of their name, family background and their unique relationship 
with the board of directors and other stockholders (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; 
Finkelstein, 1992).  Founder status will be coded in the same manner as Bigley and 
Wiersema (2002) using a range from 0 to 2, with higher values signifying greater levels 
of power.  It will be coded as a 0 if the CEO or other TMT member is not a founder, as a 
1 if he/she is related to the founder but does not have the same last name and as a 2 if the 
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individual is the founder or is related to the founder with the same last name.  Data will 
be gathered from the firm’s proxy statements. 
Participation on boards of other organizations provides an individual with 
additional social networks and a higher level of prestige (Daily and Johnson, 1997; 
Useem, 1979) and becomes a potent source of power (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994).  This dimension will be calculated for 
the CEO and the TMT of both the acquiring and target firm.  It will be coded as a 0 if the 
individual only serves on the board in which he/she is employed and this number will be 
increased by the number of additional boards (profit and not for profit) in which this 
individual serves, with higher numbers signifying higher levels of prestige power.  Board 
membership will be collected from firm’s proxy statements and from Who’s Who in 
Finance and Industry. 
Once all the individual data is gathered, a measure is required to determine the 
team adjusted prestige power of the entire top management team.  This study will follow 
the convention used by D’Aveni and Kesner (1993) using a summative scale on all three 
items for the CEO and each member of the TMT and then dividing the total by the 
number of members in the top management team.  Since Jensen and Zajac (2004) 
recommended that, to improve predictive significance, future researchers disaggregate 
the CEO from the rest of the management team, three measures of prestige power will be 
calculated.  One for the CEO only, another for the TMT with the CEO excluded and the 
last with the TMT including the CEO.   
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The percent change in prestige power will be calculated using the ratio of [(post-
merger firm prestige power) – (pre-acquisition firm prestige power)] divided by [pre-
acquisition firm prestige power]. 
Expert power  
Expert power is based on the executives’ ability to contribute to organizational 
success.  For the CEO, three items are used to measure this construct - CEO tenure 
(Combs and Skill, 2003; Westphal and Zajac, 1995), CEO tenure in the organization and 
CEO level of education (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Olson, 2004).  For the rest of the TMT this 
will be measured by TMT tenure, tenure in the organization and TMT level of education. 
CEO tenure and TMT tenure will be measured by the logarithm of the number of 
years an individual has worked in either the acquiring firm or target firm in that position 
(or in the case of a TMT member in a similar TMT position) at the time of its takeover.  
Prior researchers have found the log of tenure to be a better measure because tenure had a 
right skew and the effect of tenure will have diminishing returns (Buchholtz et al., 2003).  
This data will be collected from firm’s proxy statements, Dun and Bradstreet Reference 
Book of Corporate Management and Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, 
Directors, and Executives. 
CEO and TMT tenure in the organization will also be measured by the logarithm 
of the number of years an individual has worked in either the acquiring firm or target firm 
in that position or within the organization at the time of its takeover.  This data will be 
collected from the same source as CEO and TMT tenure in their position. 
Level of education will be measured on a five point skill based on highest level of 
education achieved.  It will be coded as a 1 if the individual is a high school graduate, 
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coded as 2 if he/she has had some college or a two-year diploma, a 3 if he/she has a 
bachelors degree, a 4 if a masters degree has been obtained and as a 5 if he/she has a 
PhD.  Dun and Bradstreet Directory of Corporate Management and Standard and Poor’s 
Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives will be used to gather information on 
educational level. 
Similar to the convention used for prestige power, expert power for the 
organization will use a summative scale on all three items for the CEO and each member 
of the TMT and then dividing the total by the number of members in the top management 
team.  Again, following the recommendations of Jensen and Zajac (2004), the CEO will 
be disaggregated from the rest of the TMT.  One for the CEO only, another for the TMT 
with the CEO excluded and the last with the TMT including the CEO.   
The percent change in expert power will be calculated using the ratio of [(post-
merger firm expert power) – (pre-acquisition firm expert power)] divided by [pre-
acquisition firm expert power]. 
Structural power 
Structural power will only be calculated for the CEO and not for the rest of the 
management team.  Structural power is bestowed upon an individual based on his/her 
hierarchal position within the organization.  The greater the number of titles, the higher 
the CEO structural power (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Finkelstein, 1992; Olson, 2004).  
Finkelstein (1992) operationalized structural power by the number of titles held by the 
CEO; however, Olson (2004) reasoned that a CEO with an additional title of chairman of 
the board would be more powerful than a CEO that had the additional title of president.  
Consequently, for study, CEO power will be coded as a 1 if the only title the CEO has is 
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CEO.  It will be coded as a 2 if the CEO is also the president and/or chief operating 
officer (COO).  It will be coded a 3 if the CEO has the title of CEO and chairman of the 
board.  It will be coded a 4 if the CEO has the title of CEO, chairman of the board and 
president (COO).  The greater the number of titles, the higher the structural power 
(Bigley and Wiersema, 2002).  Data for this measure will be collected from company 
annual reports and proxy statements. 
Ownership power 
Ownership power will be measured by the percentage of shares owned by the 
executive or his/her immediate family (Finkelstein, 1992).  Data for this measure will be 
collected from proxy statements. 
Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables within this study that measure performance.  
One is target executive retention and the other is post-acquisition firm performance.   
Data will be captured on executives that formally resided in the target and 
acquiring firms and on the executives that were members of the TMT in the post-merger 
firm.  To evaluate target executive retention, a weighted average mean measure called 
percent target retention will be calculated using the following equation:  
Target executive retention = Target executives / (total executives in post-acquisition firm)  
 
Since one indicator is unable to reliably capture post-acquisition firm 
performance, this study will utilize two very distinct measures of this construct 
(Chakravarthy, 1986; Venkatraman and Grant, 1986; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986).  First, post-acquisition firm performance will be measured using return on assets 
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(ROA) as this is a measure that is frequently used to evaluate strategic actions 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Harrison et al., 1991; Krishnan et al., 1997).  Following 
the convention utilized by Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994), ROA will be examined one 
year after the date of the merger.  To control for industry effects, the number will be 
mean centered (Daily and Johnson, 1997).  The second measure that will be used is 
Jensen’s alpha.  Jensen’s alpha compares the post-acquisition firm performance with 
firms of a similar risk (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Daily and Johnson, 1997; Nayyar, 
1993).  The M&A is deemed to be a successful if the actual post acquisition value of the 
combined firm is greater than the hypothetical expected value of the two firms if they did 
not merge (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Seth, 1990; Seth et al., 2002).  Seth (1990) 
defined the percentage gain in an acquisition as: 
(Actual post-merger value) – (Expected value of/no acquisition) 
(Expected value/no acquisition) 
 
Where the actual post-merger value is the stock value of the combined firm and 
the hypothetical expected value/no acquisition is what the value of each firm would be if 
they maintain the same position within the industry. 
Other dependent variables relate to power retention.  Expert power retention is 
measured by calculated the summated expert power in the acquiring firm (Olson, 2000) 
and subtracting this number from the summated expert power in the post-acquisition 
firm.  A positive number reflects an increase in expert power.  Prestige power is 
calculated in the same manner. 
Moderator Variables – Organizational (Financial and Human Resource) Slack 
Bourgeois (1981) suggests that organizational slack may be obtained through 
public records.  He also recommends that relative measures that compare an 
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organizational index to the index of the industry are more appropriate than absolute 
measures.  Organizational slack is divided into financial slack and human resource slack.  
Data for the measurement of both financial and human resource slack will be obtained 
from the Compusat database.  
Financial slack is divided into three separate measures – available, recoverable 
and potential slack.  This section describes a proxy for each of these variables that have 
been conventionally utilized in the strategy literature (Bourgeois, 1981; Geiger and 
Cashen, 2002; Herold et al., 2006; Singh, 1986).  Available (unabsorbed) slack is 
measured using the quick ratio and provides a measure of a firm’s liquidity.  Recoverable 
(unabsorbed) slack provides an estimate of resources that are currently being used but 
could potentially be freed up and utilized in other areas.  A proxy for this slack variable is 
calculated by dividing sales into selling, general and administration expenses (SG&A 
expenses/Sales).  Potential slack provides an estimate of the organizations borrowing 
power and the proxy for this variable is debt/equity.   
In the event of a merger of equals, which is being investigated in this dissertation, 
the acquiring firm requires significantly more resources than the available or recoverable 
slack would be able to provide.  Only potential slack has the ability to provide an 
estimate of the firm’s ability to acquire a similar sized firm.  The firm’s potential slack 
will be compared to the potential slack within the industry using the following equation:  
 
 Firm debt  -   Industry debt   
 Firm equity    Industry equity 
Numbers greater than zero signify that the acquiring firm has a higher level of 
slack than the industry. 
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The other key organizational slack measure is human resource slack.  To 
determine if either the acquiring or target firm has human resources greater than exist 
within the industry, this dissertation follows the convention used by Mishina et al. (2004).  
Human resource slack will be calculated for the acquiring and target firm using the 
following equation: 
Firm employees  -  Industry employees 
Firm Sales               Industry Sales 
Numbers greater than zero signify that the acquiring and/or target firm have a 
higher level of slack than the industry. 
Control Variables 
This dissertation will control for firm size and for acquiring firm prior 
profitability.  In addition, all variables will be mean centered to control for industry 
effects.   
Analytical Techniques 
 
All hypotheses within this study will be examined using OLS regression techniques.  The 
data collected to test the hypotheses will come from a variety of archival sources.  Multi-
measurement constructs will be used to test the various relationships (Chakravarthy, 
1986; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986).  The dissertation hypotheses, measures and 
statistical technique that will be used to test the various relationships are summarized in 
Appendix B.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter discusses the results of the various statistical analyses used to test the 
research questions and hypotheses presented earlier.  The first section provides an 
overview of the sample database and how the sample was selected and then presents 
some descriptive statistics of the sample.  The second section addresses the controls 
utilized, and the third section provides the results of testing the hypothesized 
relationships presented in Chapter 3. 
Database Sample 
 
The sample used in the dissertation consisted of one hundred and eight, billion 
dollar mergers that took place within the United States from 1995 to 2005.  A breakdown 
of number of mergers by year is shown in Table 1.   
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Table 1 
 
Number of Mergers by Year 
 
Yr # of Mergers 
1995 5 
1996 11 
1997 13 
1998 12 
1999 14 
2000 16 
2001 14 
2002 5 
2003 3 
2004 5 
2005 10 
Total 108 
 
 
Originally, I had planned to use mergers up to and including those completed in 
2004; however, to increase the size of my sample, I also selected mergers that were 
completed during 2005.  The year 2005 was added, as the information became available 
during the data collection period and including this year provided ten (10) additional 
mergers.   
The original database included one thousand two hundred and thirty (1230) 
billion dollar mergers (Ellis, 2000).  To obtain the sample required to test the hypotheses 
in this dissertation, I eliminated unrelated non-synergistic mergers, mergers where the 
target and acquiring firms were dissimilar in size and mergers that were completed 
outside the 1995-2005 timeframe.  This eliminated one thousand one hundred and seven 
(1107) mergers from the database and left one hundred and twenty-three (123) mergers in 
the sample.  A chart showing the selection process for the sample is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
 
Selection of Sample Database 
 
 Eliminated Total 
Total # of billion dollar mergers in original database  1230 
Eliminated:   
- unrelated non synergistic mergers 487  
- mergers that were dissimilar in size 589  
- mergers completed outside 1995-2005 window 31  
 1107  
Original sample  123 
Eliminated mergers where target became wholly-owned 
subsidiary 
15  
Final sample  108 
 
Similar to the convention used by Haleblain and Finkelstein, (1999), a merger was 
considered as related if there was a match between the acquiring and target corporations’ 
two digit SIC code along with at least one match at the four-digit level within the 
acquiring and target firms’ top six lines of business.  I retained mergers that matched 
these criteria and eliminated four hundred and seventy-five (475) from the original 
sample.  An additional twelve (12) mergers were eliminated as they were not considered 
synergistic.  I also only retained mergers within my sample that were considered similar 
in size.  A merger was considered of similar size when one of the pre-merger firms was 
no greater than twice the size of the other (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989).  Using this 
criteria an additional five hundred and eighty-nine (589) mergers were eliminated.  This 
left one hundred and twenty-three (123) mergers. 
After collecting data on these mergers, I discovered that fifteen (15) of the target 
companies became wholly owned subsidiaries of the acquiring organization.  Since the 
intent of this dissertation was to determine whether the resultant post-merger firm was 
able to retain power within their top management team, these mergers were eliminated 
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from my sample.  In these fifteen cases, the acquiring firm had no intention of changing 
their management team structure.  The final sample size was one hundred and eight (108) 
mergers which involved two hundred and sixteen (216) pre-merger companies and one 
hundred and eight (108) post-merger organizations. 
Within the dissertation sample, seventeen (17) mergers took place within the 
banking industry.  Additional segments that had a large representation included the 
petroleum industry fourteen (14) mergers, computer industry thirteen (13) mergers, and 
telecommunications and broadcasting ten (10) mergers.  The above industry segments 
constituted fifty percent (50%) of the dissertation sample.  Other segments included, 
electrical services, aviation, chemicals, newspaper and paper mills, medical services, 
pharmaceuticals, department stores, clothing manufacturers, construction, grocery, hotels 
and gambling and employment agencies (see Table 3).  
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Table 3 
 
Merger Breakdown by Industry 
 
Industry # 
Banks and savings institutions 17 
Petroleum industry 14 
Computer peripherals and software 13 
Broadcasting (Telephone, Radio, TV, and Cable) 10 
Insurance companies 7 
Electrical services 7 
Aviation and space travel 6 
Pharmaceuticals and drug Stores 5 
Real estate 5 
Petrochemicals and plastics 3 
Paper mills 3 
Department and general merchandise stores 3 
Organic crude and dyes 2 
Other manufacturing 2 
Grocery and dairy  2 
Hotels and casinos 2 
Career and help services 2 
Medical services 2 
Office supplies 1 
Newspaper and publishing 1 
Warehousing  1 
          Total 108 
 
Mergers in the sample ranged from a merger value of 1.01 billion dollars to a high 
of 89.17 billion dollars.  The smallest merger was Accustaff/Career Horizons and the 
three largest mergers were Pfizer/Warner Lambert, Exxon/Mobil and Travelers/Citicorp 
valued at 89.17, 78.95 and 72.56 billion dollars respectively.  A list of the mergers in the 
sample is shown in Appendix C.  
Originally, I had planned to identify executives that would be included in the 
study as executives that reported to the CEO and were also directors of the organization 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Krishnan et al., 1997; Michel and Hambrick, 1992).  
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However, while coding the reference data to test the hypotheses, I discovered that forty-
seven percent (47%) of the pre-merger organizations had the CEO as the only inside 
director of the organization.  An additional thirty-three percent (33%) of the 
organizations had only the CEO and one other executive as inside directors of the 
organization.  Since the purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the top 
management team, I further researched the definition used by prior researchers and found 
that others used a broader definition which included executives at the level of senior vice 
president who reported to the CEO (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Lubatkin et al, 1999; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1993).  I therefore relaxed the condition of the executive also 
being a director of the organization and collected reference data on all executives who 
reported to the CEO that were at the level of senior vice president (executive vice 
president for the banking industry) of the acquiring, target and post-merger firms.  When 
these individuals were included, it yielded a larger base of executives than if only TMT 
officers who were also directors of the organization were selected.  There was an average 
of 7.7 executives per pre-merger organization.  The number of executives per merger 
ranged from a low of 7 (Maxim Dallas Semiconductor merger) to a high of 53 executives 
(Firstar merger with Mercantile Bancorp).  The following reference data was collected 
for each executive: 
• Position or positions he/she held in the organization. 
• Whether the individual was also a director of the organization. 
• Tenure in the position and in the organization.  
• Tenure as an executive within this organization.  
• Whether the individual was a founder.  
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• Educational degrees obtained where they received those degrees.  
• Number of degrees the executive obtained from prestigious universities.  
• Professional designations. 
• Date he/she retired or left the organization. 
This information was collected from company annual reports, corporate proxy 
statements, Who’s Who in America, Who’s Who in Finance and Industry, Dun and 
Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Managements, company websites and other 
internet searches.  Utilizing the above information, I was able to obtain metrics on 
structural, expert and prestige power at the organizational level for the acquiring, target 
and post-merger firms.  Additionally data was collected at the company and industry 
level for performance and slack metrics from Robert Morris Associates, Annual statement 
Studies, 1997 Economic Census and the 2002 Economic Census.  Descriptive statistics on 
the variables utilized are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics –Dependent and Control Variables 
 
 N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ROA yr1 less ROA yr0 108 -4.178 .514 -.072 .460 
Jensen’s Alpha 108 -.964 2.461 -.006 .512 
Target Exec Retention in p-mgr firm 108 .0 .8 .209 .190 
Expert power retention 108 -11.94 11.43 .39 3.59 
Prestige power retention 108 -3.21 5.5 .18 1.16 
TGT size / (TGT + ACQ size) 108 .325 .654 .4655 .090 
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Independent and Moderator Variables 
 
 N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Act retention less expect Retention 108 
     
(7.00) 
          
3.50     (2.09)          1.98  
Expert ∆ tenure as exec (P-A) 108 
       
(5.81) 
          
4.80     (0.15)          1.52  
Expert ∆ tenure in org (P-A) 108 
       
(8.60) 
        
11.28     (0.22)          2.49  
Expert ∆ level of educ (P-A) 108 
       
(1.46) 
          
1.00     (0.02)          0.41  
Prestige ∆ elite educ Co (P-A) 108 
       
(0.58) 
          
0.60     (0.01)          0.19  
Prest incr in founder 1-Yes 0-No 108 
              
-   
          
1.00      0.05           0.21  
Prestige incr in for profit boards 108 
       
(3.00) 
   
5.00      0.19           1.12  
Founder Status 1= T higher 0=no 108 
              
-   
          
1.00      0.05           0.21  
Expert Tenure as exec (A-T) 108 
     
(16.98) 
        
17.85      0.13           4.97  
Expert Tenure in org (A-T)  108 
  
(20.93) 
        
21.17      0.61           7.04  
Prestige Elite educ (A-T)  108 
       
(1.21) 
          
4.00      0.07           0.62  
Expert Level of Educ (A-T)  108 
       
(4.50) 
          
4.92     (0.02)          1.19  
Prestige Corp Dir (A-T) 108 
       
(6.00) 
        
16.00      0.60           2.77  
CEO Struct pwr ∆ 1=lower  0=no 108 
              
-   
          
1.00      0.18           0.38  
Elite Edu-Target  108 
              
-   
          
4.00      2.31           0.39  
Target # FP BRDS 108 
  
-   
          
7.00      1.02           1.70  
Exp tenure as exec-Target  108 
         
1.67  
        
26.60      8.05           4.27  
 
Control Variables 
 
Initial control variables included firm size and profitability.  However, these did 
not have a significant effect on the model.  Therefore an additional search was completed 
to determine other variables that are currently used in the academic literature.  
Munificence (Dess and Beard, 1986) was then included, but this variable also was not a 
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significant variable due to the diversity of mergers that have been included in the 
dissertation sample.  Even though this dissertation only examined mergers where the 
acquiring and target firm were similar in size (i.e. one firm was no greater than twice the 
size of the other), it was found that it was still important to control for relative size 
(Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Walsh, 1988, Weber, 1996).  Consequently, all 
regressions were controlled for the relative size of the acquiring versus the target firm.   
The expert power and prestige non-categorical variables which include 1) tenure 
in the organization, 2) tenure as an executive, 3) education level, and 4) number of for 
profit boards were all mean centered.  I ran the various regressions where the variables 
were mean centered on the industry average and ran the same regressions using the actual 
numbers.  The regression results were the same whether the variables were mean centered 
or not, therefore, all regression runs results within this dissertation included the actual 
numbers. 
Hypotheses Testing Results 
 
All hypotheses were tested using linear regression as the regression assumptions 
were not violated.  As mentioned above, the size of the target firm in relationship to the 
combined size of both the acquiring and target firm was used as a control variable.  
As per recommendations of Jensen and Zajac (2004), I ran the regression models 
first including the CEO as part of the top management team and then the same regression 
equations were re-run where the CEO was excluded from the top management team.  The 
results were consistent whether the CEO was included in the top management team or 
was excluded from the team.  Therefore, all results reported from this point forward 
include the CEO in the top management team.  A correlation table of all the variables is 
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found in Table 6.  Due to the number of variables, this table is divided up into two 
sections.  Table 6A provides the correlation among the direct effect hypotheses and Table 
6b provides this same information for the moderation hypotheses. 
Table 6A 
Direct Effects Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Control Rel Size 1                           
2 DV ROA Yr1-Yr0 
-.099 1                         
3 DV Jensen's Alpha 
-.057 .230* 1                       
4 % Exec Retention 
.089 -.077 -.024 1                     
5 Act Reten less expect reten 
-.312** -.088 .015 .693** 1                   
6 Prest ∆ elite educ (P-A) 
.009 .266** -.090 -.020 -.038 1                 
7 Prest ∆ board memb (P-A) 
.141 -.055 .047 .384** .250** .105 1               
8 Exp ∆ tenure as exec (P-A) 
.159 .025 .096 -.088 -.093 .019 .124 1             
9 Exp ∆ tenure in org (P-A) 
.179 .001 .187 -.101 -.208* .003 -.102 .612** 1           
10 Exp ∆ educ level (P-A) 
.098 -.034 -.036 .168 .139 .498** .296** -.087 -.166 1         
11 Exp ∆ tenure as exec (A-T) 
-.031 .031 .123 .027 .017 .056 -.059 -.496** -.159 .114 1       
12 Exp ∆ tenure in org (A-T) 
-.185 .042 .048 -.062 .000 .110 -.003 -.439** -.503** .197* .665** 1     
13 Prest ∆ elite educ (A-T) 
-.010 -.078 .239* -.020 .135 -.322** -.082 -.038 -.015 -.231* .032 -.002 1   
14 Exp ∆ educ level (A-T) 
-.106 .073 .106 -.011 -.074 -.169 -.195* -.022 .044 -.460** -.032 -.046 .094 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 67
Table 6B 
Moderation Effects Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Exp pwr (P-A) 1         
2 Prest pwr (P-A) 
.221* 1        
3 Tgt HR slack 
.097 -.009 1       
4 Acq HR slack 
-.064 .010 -.004 1      
5 Tgt Boards 
.086 .489** -.057 -.045 1     
6 Tgt elite educ 
.177 .172 .034 .052 .134 1    
7 Tgt educ lvl 
-.048 .100 -.018 -.064 .048 .520** 1   
8 Tgt exp as exec 
.183 -.064 -.098 -.062 .014 .001 .006 1  
9 Tgt exp in org 
.074 .070 -.061 -.084 .223* .134 .074 .662** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Results of the statistical analysis are reported within the next two sections.  The 
first section provides information on the direct effects hypotheses which include 
hypotheses 1-5.  The second section addresses the results of the moderated hypotheses. 
Direct Effect Hypotheses 
In this study, two separate measures were used to assess performance.  The first is 
return on assets (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Harrison et al., 1991; Krishnan et al., 
1997) and the second is Jensen’s alpha which is a measure developed by Seth (1990) 
which utilizes stock market metrics.  Jensen’s alpha compares the post-acquisition firm 
performance with the hypothetical expected value of the two firms if they did not merge 
(Seth, 1990; Seth et al., 2002).  Seth (1990) defined the percentage gain in an acquisition 
as: 
(Actual post-merger value) – (Expected value/no acquisition) 
(Expected value/no acquisition) 
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Where the actual post-merger value is the stock value of the combined firm and 
the hypothetical expected value/no acquisition is what the value of each firm would be if 
they maintain the same position within the industry. 
The first hypothesis posited that higher target executive retention would result in 
increased firm performance.  Hypotheses two through four relate to the impact of TMT 
expert and prestige power on post-merger implementation effectiveness and theorized 
that the retention of power from target executives would increase post-merger firm 
performance.  Hypothesis five dealt with structural power at the CEO level and posited 
that a CEO’s willingness to reduce his/her level of structural power from that which 
he/she had within one of the pre-merger firms would increase target executive retention 
and post-merger firm performance.  Table 7 provides a summary of key statistical data 
for the direct effect hypotheses. 
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Table 7 
 
Regression Results – Direct Effect Hypotheses (R2 is Included if the Model is 
Significant)* 
 
 df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
H1 using ROA as the DV 2 1.374 .258   
H1 using Jensen’s alpha as the DV  2 .170 .844   
 
 df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
Prestige power impacts      
H2A using ROA as the DV  4 16.553 .000 .391 .368 
H2A using Jensen’s alpha as the DV 4 1.306 .273   
      
Expert power impacts      
H2B using ROA as the DV  4 .313 .868   
H2B using Jensen’s alpha as the DV 4 1.18 .324   
 
 df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
Prestige power impacts on exec retention      
H3A – using all prestige dimensions 4 2.863 .027 .100 .065 
H3A - excluding founder dimension 3 2.680 .051   
      
Expert power impacts on exec retention      
H3B – using all expert power dimensions 4 .442 .778   
 
 df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
Prestige power impacts on performance      
H4A using ROA as DV 4 1.196 .315   
H4A using Jensen’s alpha as the DV 4 .229 .876   
      
Expert power impacts on performance      
H4B mergers using ROA as DV 4 1.051 .301   
H4B using Jensen’s alpha as the DV 4 .287 .835   
 
Impact of CEO structural power df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
H5A using exec retention as the DV  2 7.344 .000 .123 .106 
H5B using ROA as the DV  2 .863 .425   
H5B using Jensen’s alpha as the DV 2 .274 .761   
*Betas are shown in Appendix D 
No support was found for hypothesis one whether performance was measured by 
Jensen’s alpha or by return on assets.  For hypotheses two through four, three items were 
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used to measure prestige power - elite education, founder status and number of for profit 
boards in which the executive serves (Finkelstein, 1992).  Expert power was measured 
using tenure in the organization, tenure as an executive and level of education 
(Finkelstein, 1992).  Support with a R2 of 0.39 was found for hypothesis 2A when return 
on assets as the dependent variable was used (F=16.553, Sig=.000).  This hypothesis 
theorized that an increase in prestige power in the post-merger firm over the power that 
existed in the acquiring firm would result in greater post-acquisition firm performance.  
No support was found for this hypothesis H2A using Jensen’s alpha.  
No support was found for hypothesis H2B relating to the expert power dimension 
whether firm performance was measured using ROA or Jensen’s alpha.  This was found 
to be true for all hypotheses relating to the expert power dimension.  Expert power is 
made up of three dimensions which include tenure as an executive, tenure in the 
organization and level of education.  An examination of the mean averages of each of 
these dimensions within the sample determined that these dimensions were materially the 
same in the acquiring, target and post-merger firms and in all cases the mean average in 
the post-merger firm was less than the averages within the acquiring firm.  As an 
example, tenure as an executive was 8.17 years in the acquiring firm, 8.05 years in the 
target firm and 8.02 years in the post-merger firm.  Table 8 provides a breakdown of the 
means of the expert power dimensions for each of the firms.  
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Table 8 
 
Dissertation Sample – Mean Average of Expert Power Dimensions 
 
Firm Tenure as an 
executive 
Tenure in the 
organization 
Level of Education 
Acquiring 8.17 12.95 5.39 
Target 8.05 12.34 5.40 
Post-merger 8.02 12.73 5.32 
 
The third hypothesis dealt with the interaction of prestige and expert power within 
the acquiring and target firms on post-merger target executive retention.  Hypothesizing 
that target executive retention is strengthened when those executives perceive that the 
acquiring firm has a higher level of prestige power than that which exists in the target 
organization.  H3A relating to prestige power was significant (F=2.863, Sig=.027) and 
explained 10% of the model.  An examination of the coefficients found that the only 
significant prestige dimension was the number of external “for profit” boards the 
executive is a member of.  The dimension of founder status was not significant.  An 
examination of the database identified that only five (5) mergers of the one hundred and 
twenty-three still had a founder as an active member of the top executive team.  This may 
be due to the size of the mergers examined within this dissertation as a merger was not 
considered unless the cost of the merger was one billion dollars or more.  Inasmuch as 
this could be providing noise in my regression equation, hypothesis 3A (using ROA as a 
DV) was re-run where the variable of founder status was taken out.  The result was not 
significant (F=2.680, Sig=.051).  
The fourth hypothesis theorized that when the target firm has greater prestige and 
or expert power than that possessed by the acquiring firm that performance will be 
improved when the post-acquisition firm is able to retain a high number of target firm 
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executives.  No support was found for this hypothesis whether the DV was measured 
using Jensen’s alpha or ROA.  Additional explanation of the rationale for this occurrence 
is discussed in Chapter 5 
Hypothesis five is the only hypothesis dealing with structural power at the CEO 
level.  It posits that target executive retention and post-merger performance will be 
enhanced when the CEO of the post-merger firm agrees to lower his/her structural power 
from that which he/she had within one of the pre-merger firms.  Support was found for 
Hypothesis 5A as it relates to executive retention (F=7.344, Sig.=.000) and the adjusted R 
square on this model is 10.6%.  However, no support was found for performance whether 
measured by accounting or stock measures.   
Moderated Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 deal with the impact of financial slack and human resource 
slack on the power retention relationship.  Gary (2005) found support that merger 
effectiveness is influenced by the level of slack within the acquiring and target firms.  
Slack is broken down into two distinct types of slack.  The first is financial slack which 
provides the acquiring company with the necessary funds to merge the companies and the 
second is human resource slack which allows executives sufficient time to devote to 
implementation processes.  To facilitate a successful implementation, financial slack 
should be present within the acquiring firm; whereas, human resource slack can be 
present within either the acquiring or target firms.  Table 9 provides a summary of key 
statistical data for the moderated hypotheses: 
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Table 9 
 
Regression Results – Moderation Hypotheses (R2 is Included if the Model is 
Significant)* 
 
Moderating Influence of Financial Slack df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
H6A Acq firm fin slack moderating impact on 
prestige power retention  
8 5.304 .000 .260 .208 
H6B Acq firm fin slack moderating impact on 
expert power retention  
8 1.369 .220   
 
Moderating Influence of HR Slack df F Signif R2 Adj R2 
H7A Acq firm HR slack’s moderating impact 
on prestige power retention  
8 5.837 .000 .321 .266 
H7B Acq firm HR slack’s moderating impact 
on expert power retention  
8 1.709 .106   
H7C Target firm HR slack’s moderating 
impact on prestige power retention  
8 4.934 .000 .287 .229 
H7D Target firm HR slack’s moderating 
impact on expert power retention  
7 1.642 .132   
* Betas are shown in Appendix D 
Hypothesis six dealt with the moderating influence of financial slack within the 
acquiring firm on the retention of target firm prestige (expert) power within the post-
merger firm.  Hypothesis seven examined the moderating influence of human resource 
slack either present within the acquiring or target firm on retention of target prestige 
(expert) power within the post acquisition firm.  To ensure that any effect discovered was 
related to a moderating influence rather than a direct effect influence, I ran several 
regression equations to examine the significance from the direct effect of each of the 
slack variables and found them not to be significant.  
Significance was found for the moderating impact of acquiring firm financial 
slack on prestige power retention (F=5.304, Sig.=.000).  The adjusted R2 within this 
model was 20.8%.  No significance was found for the hypothesis 6B that relates to the 
moderating impact of acquiring firm financial slack on expert power retention.  
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Hypotheses 7A and 7B investigated the moderating impact of acquiring firm 
human resource slack on prestige (expert) power retention within the post-acquisition 
firm.  Whereas, hypotheses 7C and 7D examined this relationship in relation to target 
firm human resource slack.  Support was found that HR slack strengthened the 
relationship between target firm prestige power and post-merger prestige power retention.  
In relation to hypothesis 7A that addresses acquiring firm human resource slack, the 
regression equation explained 26.6% of the observed effects (F=5.837, Sig.=.000); 
whereas in Hypothesis 7C, this relationship explained 22.9% of the observed effects 
(F=4.934, Sig.=.000).  However, no support was found for the moderating influence of 
human resource slack on expert power retention (hypotheses 7B and 7D).   
Summary of Results 
 
There was significant support for some of the hypotheses.  Evidence was found 
that the retention of prestige power has a positive impact on firm performance, when this 
performance is measured using ROA.  (See Table 7 - H2A; Table 9 - H6A, H7A and 
H7C.)  In addition evidence was also found that the levels of prestige power between the 
acquiring and target firm have an impact on executive retention.  In this study, target 
executives were more inclined to stay in the post-merger firm when they perceived that 
the acquiring firm had a higher level of power than that which existed in the target 
organization (Table 7 – H3A).  When the founder dimension is excluded from the 
prestige power construct in Hypothesis 3A, only marginal support was found as the 
significance went from 0.27 to 0.51.  Also support was found for the hypothesis that 
target executives are more disposed to stay in the post-merger organization when the top 
executive is willing to reduce his her own level of formal organizational power (Table 7 – 
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H5A).  Finally, the results of this study provide evidence that acquiring firm financial 
slack and both acquiring and target firm human resource slack have a positive moderating 
influence on the retention of prestige power in the post-merger firm (Table 9 – H6A, 
H7A, H7C). 
On the other hand, support was not found for hypotheses.  No support was found 
that the retention of target executives results in post-merger firm performance (Table 7 – 
H1).  No support was found that the retention of prestige power will result in improved 
post-merger firm performance when these hypotheses were measured using Jensen’s 
alpha (Table 7 –H1, H2A, H4A, H5B).  In addition, no support was found on hypotheses 
relating to the expert power dimension (Table 7 –H2B, H3B, H4B; Table 9 –H6B, H7B, 
H7D).  Also, when the target executives were perceived to have a higher level of prestige 
power than the level of prestige power of the pre-merger acquiring firm, no support was 
found that the retention of these target executives resulted in greater post-merger firm 
performance (Table 7 – H4A).  This was true whether performance was measured using 
ROA or Jensen’s alpha.  And finally, no support was found that an executive’s 
willingness to reduce his/her level of structural power will result in improved post-merger 
firm performance Table 7 – H5B).  Again, this was true whether performance was 
measured using ROA or Jensen’s alpha. 
Chapter five addresses potential rationale behind both the significant findings and 
the non-significant findings.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Value creation in M&A’s is derived through how effectively executives manage 
the interdependencies involved in integrating the organizations (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991).  However, implementation difficulties may offset many of the value opportunities 
the acquiring organization wants to obtain (Nayyar, 1993).  The integration of two firms, 
even though they may appear to be fairly similar, is risky (Biggadike, 1979), complex 
(Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988) and disruptive (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993).  This 
is due to issues such as potential employee resistance (Pitts, 1976), differences in 
managerial styles between the two organizations (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Lubatkin, 
1983), a quest for status (Frank, 1985) and sociocultural integration processes 
(Shrivastava, 1986).  Integration requires the meshing of people, culture and 
organizational practices (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988) and frequently, the tacit, 
socially complex and idiosyncratic knowledge the acquiring firm requires does not 
transfer to the new organization (Ranft and Lord, 2002).   
Academics from a variety of disciplines have explored the M&A phenomenon 
utilizing their own theoretical lenses (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).  Much of the early 
research on M&A performance concentrated on strategic fit to ascertain the viability of 
the merger and ignored organizational fit (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and 
 77
Lubatkin, 2001).  Within the last couple of decades, researchers have transferred some of 
their focus to the examination of organizational fit and/or acquisition integration (Pablo, 
1994).  Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) in their review of the M&A literature concluded 
that organizational integration was the strongest predictor of post-merger acquisition 
success.  In this dissertation, M&A integration performance is examined through the lens 
of the post-acquisition firm. 
 Since Kitching’s (1967) empirical review where he found evidence, that one 
reason M&A fail is because of disturbed reporting relationships within the post-
acquisition firm, the four most common factors investigated (King et al, 2004) in the 
academic literature were:  
• level of diversification and synergy (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Kusewitt, 
1985; Lubatkin, 1983; Seth, 1990; Singh and Mongomery, 1987),  
• relatedness (Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin, 1983),  
• method of payment (Travlos, 1987)  and  
• acquisition experience (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999, Hayward, 2002; 
Lubatkin, 1983; Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
Even though the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions has been researched for 
over half a century, King et al. (2004) in their meta analysis concluded that none of these 
four most commonly researched variables were sufficient in explaining post-acquisition 
performance.  Barkema and Schijven (2008) in their review of past research concluded 
that researchers need to dig deeper as there are important contingencies that are not being 
investigated.  To provide a greater understanding of post merger firm effectiveness these 
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authors have recommended that future researchers develop more complex models that 
may uncover important contingencies that are at play.  
Previous research has found a relationship between demographic characteristics 
such as education, functional background, age, power and strategy preferences to 
organizational outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  There is empirical support that the functional background 
of the top management team and the CEO, coupled with their strategic preferences and 
experiences, can affect acquisition activities (Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Palmer and Barber, 
2001; Song, 1982; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  However, few studies have investigated 
the link of top management team power and post merger firm effectiveness (Krishnan 
and Park, 2003).   
This study had two purposes.  One purpose was to investigate pre-merger 
management team power characteristics of both the acquiring and target firms with the 
retention of power in the post-merger firm.  Specifically, the objective of the study was to 
examine prestige and expert power (Finkelstein, 1992) that existed in the pre-acquisition 
firms and the retention of these power dimensions in the post-merger firm.  It also 
examined the effect of the retention of target executives and the competencies and 
resources (Barney, 1991) which they possess on post-merger performance effectiveness.  
Since Gary (2005) found evidence that the absence of slack will destroy value due to 
insufficient attention to merger implementation issues, another purpose of this study was 
to investigate the moderating role of financial and human resource slack on post-merger 
power retention.  
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A model of this process was discussed in Chapter 1 (See Figure 1).  The potential 
contributions of this study include an appreciation of what drives an effective acquisition 
and includes: 1) an expanded understanding of CEO and TMT power characteristics on 
merger effectiveness; and 2) knowledge on the interaction effect of slack on post-merger 
power retention.  The next two sections provide some explanations of the hypothesized 
results. 
Explanation of Results – Direct Effects Hypotheses 
 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) found that post acquisition performance improved 
when the top management team of the post-merger firm included executives from the 
target organization and this finding was supported by Zollo and Singh (2004) where they 
found that replacing target executives has a negative impact on performance.  An 
objective of this dissertation is to build upon and extend this line of inquiry to not only 
determine whether the post-acquisition firm was able to retain target executives but also 
whether they were able to retain the power which they possess.   
Support was not found that post-merger firm performance was increased when a 
higher portion of target executives were retained.  One reason this may have occurred is 
that a simple numerical examination of target executive retention does not consider 
whether the acquiring firm intended to retain that executive (Cannella and Hambrick, 
1993).  Another reason for non-significant findings was the age of the executives was not 
taken into account and it may be the intent of the target executive to retire or to move on 
to other opportunities.  Buchholtz et al (2003) found support that the rate of departure of 
target executives in the post-merger firm is enhanced when the executive is either early in 
his or her career or close to the point of retiring.  Another potential reason why 
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significance was not found is that the examination of target executive retention is only 
one component of post-merger firm performance and the importance of this requirement 
may be considered minor when compared to other significant issues such as whether the 
merger was a wise strategic decision or whether the acquiring firm overpaid for the 
competencies which they were striving to receive.  
Whereas no support was found that target executive retention (hypothesis 1) 
results in improved post-merger performance, support was found that the retention of 
prestige power from target executives does result in improved post-acquisition 
performance (hypothesis 2A).  This finding provides evidence that post-merger 
performance is not so much dependant on the retention of target executives, but rather on 
the types of power and/or competencies the target executives have that can be transferred 
to the post-merger firm.   
Unfortunately, this finding was not replicated when Jensen’s alpha was used as 
the dependent variable to measure performance.  This was the case for not only this 
hypothesis, but also for all other hypotheses that utilized Jensen’s alpha as the dependent 
variable.  Jensen’s alpha is measured using stock market measures and attempts to 
ascertain whether the resultant post-merger firm has a higher market capitalization than 
would have occurred if each firm had remained as a separate entity.  The actual market 
capitalization of the post-merger firm one year after the merger can be accurately 
measured as the data is available.  However, the calculation of the market capitalization 
of each of the pre-merger firms if they did not merge can only be estimated on the basis 
of how well their competitors performed during that one year period.  There is a built in 
assumption that the pre-merger firm would remain in the same quartile in relation to their 
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competitor that existed at the time of the merger.  Perhaps, this assumption may not be 
true which could have complicated the reliability of the performance measure.  Another 
reason significance may not have been found is that it may take longer for the stock 
market to reflect success whereas ROA, as a measure of efficiency, would measure these 
effects more directly and quickly.  In addition, stock price may be too broad a measure as 
it measures all aspects of the firm’s performance and whether an executive remains 
within the post-merger firm may not have a significant impact on the post-merger stock 
price.  Alternatively, after the initial market reactions at the time of the merger 
announcement, the market may take longer than one year to determine whether the 
merger is deemed to be a success.   
No support was found for hypothesis 2B and all other hypotheses that examined 
the retention of expert power.  Using the expert power dimension validated and tested by 
Finkelstein (1992), and used within this study, executives have very similar levels of 
education and experience (See Table 8) and there is very little to distinguish the post-
merger expert power dimension from the pre-acquisition firm expert power dimension.  
Since expert power is defined as the executives’ ability to contribute to organizational 
success (Finkelstein, 1992), it is believed that this would be a very important competency 
that an acquiring firm would want to acquire and additional research in this area is 
required.  
Support was also found for the hypothesis that target executives would be more 
inclined to remain with the post-merger organization when there is a perception that the 
acquiring firm has a higher level of prestige power than that of the target.  Perhaps these 
executives believe this type of environment will provide them with a greater opportunity 
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for growth as the acquiring TMT may have more refined social networks or higher levels 
of competence to manage the newly created organization.  Since the acquiring firm has a 
higher level of prestige power than that of the target firm, it is believed that the acquiring 
firm would not wish to retain all target executives.  However, they may want to retain 
target executives that have the competencies and skills that could complement their 
organization.  Even though D’Aveni and Kesner (1993) found that target managers would 
be more agreeable to remain in the organization, the actual number of target executives 
retained in the post-merger organization is influenced by the acquiring firm’s opinion on 
whether these executives would help strengthen the overall level of prestige power in the 
post-merger firm.   
No support was found for hypothesis 4A which theorized that post-merger 
performance is enhanced when the acquiring firm is able to retain a larger percentage of 
target executives when it is found that the target firm has a higher level of prestige power 
than that of the acquiring firm.  These executives may feel their status has been reduced 
(Hambrick and Cannella, 1993) as they are now required to join a firm that they consider 
to be inferior.  Also these executives may have a number of other attractive alternatives 
which they may choose over that of becoming an executive in the post-merger 
organization. 
Support was found for the hypothesis that as the CEO of the post-merger firm is 
willing to reduce his/her level of structural power from that which he/she had within the  
pre-merger firm, that this would improve the level of target executive retention.  
Structural power is measured by the type and number of positions the executive holds.  A 
CEO who is also chairman of the board has a high level of structural power as he/she not 
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only is the senior executive within the firm, but also has authority in controlling and/or 
influencing board decisions.  If that executive also has the title of President or Chief 
Operating Officer, the power is increased even further as he/she has very few checks and 
balances.  Stepping down from one of the power positions will allow other executives an 
opportunity to step into that role and sends a message through the organization that the 
executive is willing to work with others.   
The above hypothesis dealt with the direct effect of prestige and expert power as 
it relates to post-merger firm performance.  However, many other factors may also have 
to be considered such as whether the acquiring firm had the financial wherewithal to 
effectively manage the merger and whether the acquiring and/or target firm had the 
managerial resources necessary to facilitate an effective implementation.  The first item 
deals with financial slack and the second with human resource slack which are addressed 
in the next section.  
Explanation of Results – Moderation Effects Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses six (6) and seven (7) dealt with the moderating influence of financial 
and human resource slack on power retention.  Effective integration requires a substantial 
commitment of managerial resources (Haspeslagh and Jemsion, 1991).  These could 
consist of financial and/or managerial resources.  Gary (2005), identified that insufficient 
slack may contribute to unsuccessful merger outcomes and thus recommended that slack 
be considered when investigating mergers.  
Financial slack was not significant as a direct effect on merger outcomes.  
However, it was significant as it relates to moderating the relationship between target 
firm prestige power and post-merger prestige power retention.  Having sufficient 
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financial resources to manage the implementation through the various stages was found 
to be necessary for the acquiring company to obtain the competencies it was striving to 
acquire.   
No significance was found on the moderating role of financial slack on expert 
power retention.  This is not surprising as there was no significance in the main effect 
hypotheses relating to expert power.  This finding may be more a function of the nature 
of the expert power data that existed within my sample than on whether financial slack 
may be an appropriate moderator.   
Financial resources need to be resident within the acquiring firm, however, human 
resource slack, could exist within either the acquiring or target firm.  The integration of 
two organizations into one well performing unit requires a significant commitment of 
human resources (Graebner, 2004; Haspeslagh and Jameson, 1991).  It was hypothesized 
that this commitment may originate from either the acquiring or target organization.  
Support was found for both Hypothesis 7A/7C which posited that acquiring/target firm 
HR slack moderates the relationship between target firm prestige power and the resultant 
post-merger target firm retention.  While support was found that human resource slack 
moderated prestige power retention whether it originated from the acquiring or target 
firm, the effect was stronger when the slack originated from the target firm, further 
strengthening Graebner’s (2004) argument that to improve the possibility of an effective 
merger, the target executives need to be involved in implementation activities.  Her study 
found that involving the target executives within merger implementation activities 
provides not only expected synergies, but also serendipitous benefits which she defined 
as unexpected synergies that were not initially identified.   
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Contributions and Implications 
 
This section examines the contributions of this research to the field of academic 
scholarship and then addresses the implications these research findings may have for 
future academic research and for the business community.  
Academic Contribution 
Prior research has examined the importance of retaining target executives.  To 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage Hatch and Dyer (2004) found that turnover 
of managers and executives must be minimized as the firms with a higher level of 
turnover significantly under perform their competitors.  Within the M&A literature, 
researchers have found evidence that the retention of executives from the target 
organization leads to improved post-merger performance (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; 
Krishnan, Miller and Judge, 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004), however within five years 
nearly 70% of target executives will no longer be associated with the post-merger firm 
(Krug and Aguilera, 2005).  Cannella and Hambrick were one of the first to examine the 
consequences of target executive departures and they found evidence that the departures 
of the more senior executives had the most severe effect on post-merger performance.   
Rather than simply examining target executive retention, this study examines the 
types of power that exist within the acquiring and target firm and the interactions these 
various power dimensions may have on post-implementation performance.  Evidence was 
found that post-merger performance was improved when the post-acquisition firm had a 
higher level of prestige power than that which existed in the pre-acquisition acquiring 
firm.   
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Support was also found that power retention is influenced by the levels of power 
that exist within the pre-merger firms.  D’Aveni and Kesner (1993), in their research 
found that target executives were more likely to agree to a merger if they felt they had 
less prestigious connections than the acquiring firm.  This study built upon and extended 
this line of inquiry to determine if executives with less prestigious connections would be 
more disposed to join the post-merger organization when they believed they had less 
prestigious connections than that of the acquiring firm.  Support was found for this 
hypothesis.  
Desai, Kroll, and Wright (2003) found that CEO duality was negatively 
associated with acquisition performance.  This study extended this line of thinking by 
examining whether the willingness of an executive to relinquish a portion of his/her 
structural power would result in improved target executive retention.  This hypothesis 
was supported.   
Additionally, the results of the study support the finding by Gary (2005) that even 
when synergy opportunities exist, that the absence of slack will destroy value as it relates 
to post-merger implementation issues.  In this study, both acquiring firm financial slack 
and human resource slack within either the acquiring or target firm positively moderated 
the relationship between target firm prestige power and post-merger power retention.   
Implications for Research 
Zollo and Singh (2004) found that the retention of top managers from the target 
firm and an increased level of integration between the two merged firms were positively 
related to performance.  The results of the dissertation did not find evidence that the 
retention of target executives led to improved performance, however, post-acquisition 
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performance was improved when the prestige power that resides within some of the 
target executives was retained.  Future studies need to extend the inquiry of target 
executive retention to ascertain whether the executives the acquiring organization was 
striving to retain, were retained.  In addition, future researchers could examine the 
competencies and skills the acquiring firm was attempting to acquire from the target 
organization to determine whether those competencies were retained.  Utilizing the power 
dimensions as a proxy for competencies, evidence was found that when the post-merger 
firm increased its level of prestige power over that which existed in the pre-merger 
acquiring firm that performance improved.  
Organizational slack, which is defined as the difference between resources that 
the firm possesses and the resources required to run the business, has been considered a 
necessary requirement in implementing diversification initiatives (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Chakravarthy, 1986; Gary, 2005; Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  Researchers have examined 
the relationship of slack to a variety of performance outcomes such as market expansion 
(Mishina, Pollock and Porac, 2004), product expansion (Mishina, Pollock and Porac, 
2004), innovation (Geiger and Cashen, 2002; Herold et al, 2006; Nohria and Gulati, 
1996), environmental uncertainty (Bourgeois, 1981; Lawson, 2001) and mergers and 
acquisitions (Gary, 2005).  Financial slack gives an organization the wherewithal to 
invest in a new venture and human resource slack provides the expertise and time to be 
able to integrate the two organizations.  The acquiring organization requires financial 
slack because without this slack they would not have the monetary resources to engage in 
the merger in the first place (Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Singh, 1986).  A number of studies 
have examined financial slack with fewer studies investigating human resource slack.  
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Mishina et al., (2004) encouraged researchers to also investigate human resource slack as 
financial and human resource slack can have different effects on post-merger 
performance.  As an example, Mishina et al., (2004) found that human resource slack 
positively moderated the relationship between market expansion and sales growth, 
whereas financial slack did not have an impact on this relationship.  Both financial and 
human resource slack were found to have a moderating impact on the retention of 
prestige power from the pre-merger target organization.  In relation to M&A’s 
implementation research, future researchers should examine the various slack variables to 
determine whether the inclusion of this variable may yield additional understanding of 
these phenomena and provide a more appropriate explanation of performance.   
In this study, both Jensen’s alpha and ROA were used to evaluate post-merger 
performance and significance was only found on the ROA measure.  ROA as a measure 
of efficiency may reflect results of a strategic decision on a timelier basis, but it may take 
a longer time for the results to be reflected in the Jensen’s alpha measure.  Consequently, 
a fruitful area for future research would be to investigate the timing impacts of these two 
distinct performance measures.   
Support was found for the prestige power dimension, but no support was found 
for the expert power dimension.  Future researchers could develop alternative measures 
of expert power to determine whether the retention of this type of power is important for 
post-merger firm performance.  In addition, an examination of the types of prestige 
power and or expert power that are more critical to retain is another fruitful field of 
inquiry.  And finally, a more fine grained analysis of these dimensions using survey data 
may unlock some of the unspecified variables alluded to by King et al (2004) 
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Implications for Management 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) concluded that organizational integration was the 
strongest predictor of success.  Yet ironically, they found that 40% of the companies 
studied did not appropriately manage the integration process. 
Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) found that when target management took an 
active role in implementation processes that key target executives and employees were 
more likely to stay and post-merger performance was enhanced.  Target executives had a 
better understanding of how their firm’s competencies could be effectively integrated into 
the post-merger organization.  They were able to provide a much higher level of comfort 
for target firm employees as they were able to anticipate and resolve potential conflicts 
on a more timely basis thus minimizing the concerns that exist whenever M&A occur.  
This resulted in not only the expected value, but in creating serendipitous value as well. 
Managers need to select the target executives they wish to retain in the post-
merger organization.  In addition, they need to identify the specific skills and 
competencies those executives possess.  Then strategies and processes should be 
established that will improve the probability of retaining those executives and the 
competencies which they possess.  One way this can be accomplished is by providing 
target executives with a pivotal role and mandate in the implementation process.  To 
facilitate the involvement of target executives in implementation processes, in the event 
that there is insufficient human resource slack within the target firm, the acquiring firm 
should utilize some of their staff to help run the target firm’s day to day business thus 
freeing up time for a few of the key target firm executives to be actively involved in 
implementation activities. 
 90
Evidence was found that when the acquiring firm’s top executive is pre-disposed 
to relinquish a portion of his/her structural power, that target executive retention is 
improved.  Providing the target CEO with a title of president or chairman of the board, 
which was formally held by the CEO of the acquiring firm, provides evidence that the 
skills of the target executive are appreciated and required.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 
The metrics within this study examined the number of target executives that 
remained in the firm after the first year anniversary of the merger.  Future studies could 
examine executive power as it relates to turnover in subsequent years as Lubatkin et al 
(1999) found that this type of study could reveal important contingencies that may be at 
play.  In their research they suggested that year one departures not only included the 
departures of executives the acquiring firms was attempting to retain, but also included 
executive departures that were planned.  Whereas, they believed that the examination of 
executive departures in years two through four may more fully capture executives that the 
post-merger firm intended to retain.   
Another area that could prove to be a fruitful area for future research is previous 
M&A experience as this was not investigated in this study.  Some authors have found that 
acquisition experience may enhance current merger implementation effectiveness 
(Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Bruton, Oviatt, and White, 1994), whereas others 
found nonsignificant findings on this relationship (Bruton et al, 1994; Hayward, 2002; 
Kroll et al, 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  More recently, authors have concluded that 
acquisition experience exhibits a U-shaped relationship on post-merger firm performance 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Reuer, 2006).  Zollo and Reuer (2006) 
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determined that after the twenty-second merger, that prior merger experience enhances 
post-merger performance.  Further, they found that alliance experience rather than 
acquisition experience had a stronger impact on current merger implementation 
performance.  
Expert power is defined as the executives’ ability to contribute to organizational 
success and yet within this study utilizing measures of expert power developed by 
Finkelstein (1992), no significance was found.  A fruitful area for future researchers to 
explore is the identification of alternative measures of expert power.  One measure that 
could be utilized to measure this dimension is “expert informant subjective assessments” 
(Data and Grant, 1990; Schoenberg, 2006).  This measure relies on ratings of press 
reports and/or financial commentaries on executives.  
Both financial and human resource slack were found to have a moderating impact 
on the retention of prestige power from the pre-merger target organization.  Future M&A 
studies should ensure both financial and HR slack are included as variables in their 
analysis.  In addition, future studies may want to examine the appropriate level of 
financial slack as previous authors have found that too much slack can be inefficient and 
wasteful (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  Geiger and Cashen 
(2002) found that there was an inverted u shape relationship between the level of 
financial slack and innovation.  If this type of relationship exists within the stream of 
innovation research, it is probable that a similar relationship may exist between financial 
slack and effectiveness of merger outcomes. 
Another field that may be useful to investigate is the role of social capital on 
merger implementation performance (Koka and Prescott, 2002).  These authors 
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developed and tested a multi-dimensional construct of social capital that contains three 
distinct types of information: that there are different types of social capital an executive 
may possess which they define as: 
1) Information volume (quantity of information),  
2) Information diversity (variety of information), and  
3) Information richness (quality of information).  
They found evidence in their investigation of alliances, that each of these 
dimensions impact firm performance in a different manner.  This type of study could 
profitably be investigated within the field of mergers and acquisitions to determine the 
types of social capital the acquiring firm may acquire and the impact each of these 
dimensions of social capital may have on subsequent post-merger firm profitability.  
In this dissertation mergers from a variety of industries were examined which 
improves generalizability.  The use of archival data does not provide an understanding of 
how each of the organizations conducted the integration activities.  Abetti (2006), using 
interviews with the acquiring and target executives, found that one reason the integration 
of Steria to Bull was so successful, was that they conducted one day and two day 
workshops that included executives from both firms.  Future researchers may want to 
combine the use of archival data with survey data to provide a better understanding of the 
M&A phenomena. 
Another very important area for future researchers to investigate is a more holistic 
approach to M&A’s.  Barkema and Schijven (2008) cautioned researchers that 
acquisitions are not isolated events and the implementation of the acquiring firm’s 
corporate strategy may take decades to be achieved as it could be contingent on the firm 
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undergoing a sequence of merger activities.  It is possible that for a firm to achieve the 
strategic position that they are striving to obtain, they may be required to undertake a 
merger that may be considered uneconomic and that investors may consider a poor 
investment.  However, once this merger has been completed the post-merger firm may be 
in a position to undertake a subsequent merger that would allow it to achieve the 
sustainable competitive advantage it was striving to obtain.  This study only examined 
each merger as separate phenomena.  Future studies may want to investigate the sequence 
of mergers a firm undertakes in order to implement a corporate strategy. 
  
Conclusions 
 
King et al (2004), in their meta analysis of empirical M&A studies, summarized 
the last two decades of research and concluded that the most commonly examined 
variables researched to date have not provided appropriate explanation of M&A 
performance.  However, they found that there were variables that the researchers have not 
yet identified that may explain significant variance in post acquisition performance and 
they encouraged future researchers to identify these variables.  Homburg and Bucerius 
(2005) also recommended that additional research in this area is needed and warranted. 
Prior researchers have found empirical support that the functional background of 
the top management team and the CEO, coupled with their strategic preferences and 
experiences, can affect acquisition activities (Finkelstein, 1992; Jensen and Zajac, 2004; 
Palmer and Barber, 2001; Song, 1982; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).   
Very little research within M&A literature has concentrated on the impact of CEO 
and TMT power characteristics (Finkelstein, 1992) of the acquiring and target firms on 
subsequent merger firm effectiveness (Krishnan and Park, 2003).  The purpose of this 
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study was to extend this line of inquiry into the TMT power dimensions.  Another 
purpose of the study was to investigate the moderating role of organizational slack on 
power retention in the post-merger organization.  
Support was found that an increase in the level of power in the post-acquisition 
firm over that which had existed in the acquiring firm resulted in a higher level of post-
merger firm performance.  Also it was found there were important contingencies within 
the power dimensions that must be analyzed to facilitate the transfer of target executive 
power into the post-merger firm.  These contingencies included an understanding of the 
power levels that existed in the pre-merger firms and the impact this may have had on the 
retention of target executive power.  In this dissertation, support was found that when the 
acquiring organization had a higher level of prestige power than that which existed within 
the target organization, that target executives were more inclined to join the post-merger 
firm.  Other important considerations were the levels of structural power within the pre 
merger organizations and the willingness of the CEO of the post-merger firm to share a 
portion of this power.  Finally, financial and human resource slack was found to provide 
a positive impact on the transfer of power from the target organization to the post-merger 
firm.
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
Dissertation Research Model 
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Figure 2 
Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) Merger and Acquisition Integrative 
Model 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Elite Educational Institutions  
 
Reprinted from Finkelstein, 1992 
 
Amherst College Princeton University 
Brown University Stanford University 
Carleton College Swarthmore College 
Columbia University United States Military Academy 
Cornell University United States Naval Academy 
Dartmouth College University of California, Berkeley 
Grinnell College University of California, Los Angeles 
Harvard University University of Chicago 
Haverford College University of Michigan 
John Hopkins University University of Pennsylvania 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Wellesley College 
New York University Wesleyan University 
Northwestern University Williams College 
Oberlin College Yale University 
Pomona College 
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Appendix B 
Hypotheses – How They were Measured and Tested 
Hypotheses Measures Method 
H1: In synergistic M&As, the higher 
the target executive retention, the 
greater the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
 
Target executive retention = % target 
executive in the post acquisition firm. Post-
acquisition firm performance is measured 
in two ways. ROA & Jensen’s alpha. 
OLS 
Regression 
H2A In synergistic M&As, the 
greater the increase in prestige 
power of the post-acquisition firm 
over the pre-acquisition prestige 
power of the acquiring firm, the 
greater the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
 
Prestige power = elite education + founder 
status + # of boards. Measured for post-
acquisition firm and pre-acquisition 
acquiring firm. Post-acquisition firm 
performance – refer to H1. Change in 
prestige power = [(post-merger firm 
prestige power) – (pre-acquisition firm 
prestige power)]. Positive number 
represents an increase 
OLS 
Regression 
H2B In synergistic M&A, the greater 
the increase in expert power of the 
post-acquisition combined firm 
over the pre-acquisition expert 
power of the acquiring firm, the 
greater the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
 
Expert power = tenure as an exec + tenure 
in the organization + level of education for 
each TMT. Post-acquisition firm 
performance – refer to H1. Change in 
expert power = (post-merger firm expert 
power) – (pre-acquisition firm expert 
power) 
OLS 
Regression 
H3A: In synergistic M&As, the 
greater (lesser) the prestige power 
of the acquiring firm over the 
prestige power of the target firm, 
the greater (lower) the target 
executive retention.  
 
Prestige power – refer to H2A.  Target 
executive retention – refer to H1.  
Measured for both pre-acquisition firms and 
the post-acquisition firm. Difference in 
prestige power = (pre-acquisition firm 
prestige power) – (pre-target firm prestige 
power)  
OLS 
Regression 
H3B: In synergistic M&As, the 
greater (lesser) the expert power of 
the acquiring firm over the expert 
power of the target firm, the greater 
(lower) the target executive 
retention.  
 
Expert power – refer to H2B.  Target 
executive retention – refer to H1.  
Measured for both pre-acquisition firms and 
the post-acquisition firm. Difference in 
expert power = (pre-acquisition firm expert 
power) – (pre-target firm expert power)  
OLS 
Regression 
H4A: When the target firm TMT has 
a higher level of prestige power 
than that of the acquiring firm, the 
greater the percentage of target 
executives on the post-acquisition 
top management team, the greater 
the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prestige power – refer to H2A.   Measured 
for both pre-acquisition firms and the post-
acquisition firm.  Target executive 
retention – refer to H1.  Post-acquisition 
firm performance – refer to H1. 
Difference in prestige power = refer to 
H3a 
OLS 
Regression 
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Hypotheses Measures Method 
H4B: When the target firm TMT has 
a higher level of expert power than 
that of the acquiring firm, the 
greater the percentage of target 
executives on the post-acquisition 
top management team, the greater 
the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
Expert power – refer to H2B.    Measured 
for both pre-acquisition firms and the post-
acquisition firm Target executive retention 
– refer to H1.  Post-acquisition firm 
performance – refer to H1. Difference in 
expert power = refer to H3b 
OLS 
Regression 
H5A In synergistic M&As, the 
greater the decrease in CEO 
structural power of the post-
acquisition firm over the CEO 
structural power in the pre-
acquisition acquiring firm, the 
greater the target executive 
retention. 
 
CEO Structural Power is calculated for 
CEO of acquiring firm and post-acquisition 
firm if they are the same individual. It is 
based on # of titles held by CEO. Measured 
as a 1 if CEO, 2 if CEO and either COO or 
President, 3 if CEO and chairman of board, 
and 4 if CEO, chairman & President/COO. 
Target executive retention–refer to H1. 
OLS 
Regression 
H5B In synergistic M&As, the 
greater the decrease in CEO 
structural power of the post-
acquisition firm over the CEO 
structural power in the pre-
acquisition acquiring firm, the 
greater the post-acquisition firm 
performance. 
CEO Structural Power refer to H5A. Post-
acquisition firm performance – refer to 
H1.  
OLS 
Regression 
H6A: Acquiring firm financial slack will 
moderate the relationship between target 
firm prestige power and post-merger firm 
prestige power retention such that as 
acquiring firm financial slack increases, the 
relationship between target firm prestige 
power and post-merger prestige power 
retention is strengthened. 
Financial slack = [(Firm debt) / (Firm 
equity)] – [(Industry debt) / (Industry 
equity)]. Numbers greater than zero would 
signify that the acquiring firm has a higher 
level of slack than the industry. Target 
prestige power – refer to H2A.  post-
merger prestige power retention = level of 
prestige power in post-merger firm 
OLS 
Regression 
H6B: Acquiring firm financial slack 
will moderate the relationship 
between target firm expert power 
and post-merger firm expert power 
retention such that as acquiring 
firm financial slack increases, the 
relationship between target firm 
expert power and post-merger 
expert power retention is 
strengthened. 
Financial slack – refer to H6A. Target 
expert power – refer to H2B. Post-
acquisition firm performance – refer to 
H1. post-merger expert power retention = 
level of expert power in post-merger firm 
OLS 
Regression 
H7A: Acquiring firm human resource 
slack will moderate the relationship 
between target firm prestige power 
and post-merger prestige power 
retention such that as acquiring 
firm human resource slack 
increases, the relationship between 
target firm prestige power and 
post-merger prestige power 
retention is strengthened. 
 
Human Resource Slack = [(Firm 
employees) / (Firm Sales)] – [(Industry 
employees) / (Industry Sales)].  Numbers 
greater than zero would signify that the 
acquiring firm has a higher level of slack 
than the industry. Measured for the 
acquiring firm. Target prestige power – 
refer to H2A.  Post-acquisition firm 
performance – refer to H1. 
OLS 
Regression 
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Hypotheses Measures Method 
H7B: Acquiring firm human resource 
slack will moderate the relationship 
between target firm expert power 
and post-merger expert power 
retention such that as acquiring 
firm human resource slack 
increases, the relationship between 
target firm expert power and post-
merger expert power retention is 
strengthened. 
Human Resource Slack - refer to H7A. 
Measured for the acquiring firm. Target 
expert power – refer to H2B. Post-
acquisition firm performance – refer to 
H1. 
OLS 
Regression 
H7C: Target firm human resource 
slack will moderate the relationship 
between target firm prestige power 
and post-merger prestige power 
retention such that as target firm 
human resource slack increases, the 
relationship between target firm 
prestige power and post-merger 
prestige power retention is 
strengthened. 
Human Resource Slack - refer to H7A. 
Measured for the target firm. Target 
prestige power – refer to H2A.  Post-
acquisition firm performance – refer to 
H1. 
OLS 
Regression 
H7D: Target firm human resource 
slack will moderate the relationship 
between target firm expert power 
and post-merger expert power 
retention such that as target firm 
human resource slack increases, the 
relationship between target firm 
expert power and post-merger 
expert power retention is 
strengthened. 
Human Resource Slack - refer to H7A. 
Measured for the target firm. Target expert 
power – refer to H2B. Post-acquisition 
firm performance – refer to H1. 
OLS 
Regression 
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Appendix C 
Billion Dollar Mergers in the Sample 
 
 
Acquirer and Target Companies 
Merger 
Date 
1 AccuStaff - Career Horizons 11/14/1996  
2 Adelphia Communications - Century Communications 10/1/1999  
3 Albertson's Inc - American Stores Co 6/24/1999  
4 Allegheny Ludlum - Teledyne 8/15/1996  
5 AlliedSignal Inc - Honeywell Inc 12/2/1999  
6 American Tower Corp - SpectraSite Inc 5/4/2005  
7 Anthem Inc - WellPoint Health Networks Inc 11/30/2004  
8 Archstone Communities Trust - Charles E Smith Realty Inc 10/31/2001  
9 Associated Banc-Corp - First Financial 10/29/1997  
10 Astoria Financial Corp - Long Island Bancorp 10/1/1998  
11 BANC ONE - First Chicago 10/2/1998  
12 BEC Energy Co - Commonwealth Energy System 8/25/1999  
13 Boeing - McDonnell Douglas 8/1/1997  
14 Boise Cascade Corp - Officemax Inc 12/9/2003  
15 Burlington Resources - Louisiana Land and Exploration 10/22/1997  
16 CalEnergy - MidAmerican Energy Holdings 3/12/1999  
17 Caremark RX Inc - AdvancePCS 3/24/2004  
18 Charles River Laboratories International Inc - Inveresk Research 
Group Inc 10/20/2004  
19 Chemical Banking - Chase Manhattan 3/31/1996  
20 Chevron Corp - Texaco Inc 10/9/2001  
21 Cimarex Energy Co - Magnum Hunter Resources Inc 6/7/2005  
22 Clear Channel Communications Inc - AMFM Inc 8/30/2000  
23 Commerce One Inc - AppNet Inc 9/14/2000  
24 Consumer Value Store - Revco DS 5/30/1997  
25 CoreStates Financial - Meridian Bancorp 4/9/1996  
26 Crompton & Knowles - Uniroyal Chemical 8/21/1996  
27 Crompton & Knowles Corp - Witco Corp 9/1/1999  
28 Crompton Corp - Great Lakes Chemical Corp 7/1/2005  
29 Devon Energy Corp - Mitchell Energy & Development Corp 1/24/2002  
30 Devon Energy Corp - PennzEnergy Co 8/17/1999  
31 Devon Energy Corp - Santa Fe Snyder Corp 8/29/2000  
32 DTE Energy Co - MCN Energy Group Inc 5/31/2001  
33 El Paso Energy Corp - Coastal Corp 1/29/2001  
34 El Paso Energy Corp - Sonat Inc 10/25/1999  
35 Exxon Corp - Mobil Corp 11/30/1999  
36 Federated Department Stores Inc - May Department Stores Co 8/30/2005  
37 Fidelity National Financial Inc - Chicago Title Corp 3/20/2000  
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Acquirer and Target Companies 
Merger 
Date 
38 First Data - First Financial Management 10/27/1995  
39 Firstar Corp - Mercantile Bancorp 9/20/1999  
40 Firstar Corp - Mercantile Bancorp 7/30/1999  
41 FirstEnergy Corp - GPU Inc 11/6/2001  
42 Fred Meyer - Smith's Foods & Drug Centers 9/9/1997  
43 Frontier - ALC Communications 8/17/1995  
44 General Growth Properties Inc - Rouse Co 11/23/2004  
45 Halliburton Co - Dresser Industries Inc 9/30/1998  
46 HealthSouth (HS) - Horizon/CMS Healthcare 10/29/1997  
47 Hercules Inc - BetzDearborn Inc 10/15/1998  
48 Hilton Hotels - Bally Entertainment 12/18/1996  
49 Houston Industries - NorAm Energy 8/6/1997  
50 Independence Community Bank Corp - Staten Island Bancorp Inc 4/13/2004  
51 Iron Mountain Inc - Pierce Leahy Corp 2/1/2000  
52 JDS Uniphase Corp - Optical Coating Laboratory Inc 2/4/2000  
53 Jefferson Smurfit - with Stone Container 11/18/1998  
54 Kana Communications Inc - Silknet Software Inc 4/19/2000  
55 Kimberly-Clark - Scott Paper 12/12/1995  
56 KLA Instruments - Tencor Instruments 4/30/1997  
57 Kmart Holding Corp - Sears Roebuck & Co 3/24/2005  
58 Lennar Corp - US Home Corp 5/2/2000  
59 Liberty Media International Inc - UnitedGlobalCom Inc 6/15/2005  
60 Lyondell Petrochemical Co - ARCO Chemical Co 7/28/1998  
61 Martin Marietta - Lockheed 3/15/1995  
62 Maxim Integrated Products Inc - Dallas-Semiconductor Corp 4/11/2001  
63 Maxtor Corp - Quantum HDD 4/2/2001  
64 Mead Corp (MC) - Westvaco Corp 1/30/2002  
65 MGM Mirage Inc - Mandalay Resort Group 4/25/2005  
66 National-Oilwell Inc - Varco International Inc 3/11/2005  
67 NationsBank Corp - BankAmerica Corp 9/30/1998  
68 NBD Bancorp - First Chicago 12/1/1995  
69 NetIQ Corp - Mission Critical Software Inc 5/15/2000  
70 New York Community Bancorp Inc - Roslyn Bancorp Inc 10/31/2003  
71 NextLink Communications Inc - Concentric Network Corp 6/19/2000  
72 Northrop Grumman Corp - Litton Industries Inc 5/30/2001  
73 Northrop Grumman Corp - TRW Inc 12/11/2002  
74 NOVA Corp - PMT Services Inc 9/24/1998  
75 Ohio Edison - Centerior Energy 11/7/1997  
76 Omnicare Inc - NeighborCare Inc 7/28/2005  
77 PacifiCare Health Systems -  FHP International 2/14/1997  
78 Patterson Energy Inc - UTI Energy Corp 5/8/2001  
79 Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust - Crown American 
Realty Trust 11/20/2003  
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Acquirer and Target Companies 
Merger 
Date 
80 Peregrine Systems Inc - Remedy Corp 8/27/2001  
81 Pfizer Inc - Warner-Lambert Co 6/19/2000  
82 Phillips Petroleum Co - Conoco Inc 8/30/2002  
83 Phillips Petroleum Co Inc - Tosco Corp 9/17/2001  
84 Phone.com Inc - Software.com Inc 11/17/2000  
85 Potomac Electric Power Co - Conectiv Inc 8/1/2002  
86 Praxair - CBI Industries 3/12/1996  
87 Provident - Paul Revere 3/27/1997  
88 Rite Aid - Thrifty Payless Holdings 12/12/1996  
89 Rohm and Haas Co - Morton International Inc 6/21/1999  
90 SBC Communications - Pacific Telesis 4/1/1997  
91 Seagate Technology - Conner Peripherals 2/5/1996  
92 Security Capital Pacific Trust - Security Capital Atlantic 6/30/1998  
93 Simon Property Group - DeBartolo Realty 8/9/1996  
94 Southdown - Medusa 6/30/1998  
95 Sprint Corp - Nextel Communications Inc 8/12/2005  
96 St Paul Cos - USF&G 4/24/1998  
97 Suiza Foods Corp - Dean Foods Co 12/21/2001  
98 Transocean Sedco Forex Inc - R&B Falcon Corp 1/31/2001  
99 Travelers Group Inc - with Citicorp 10/8/1998  
100 Tribune Co - Times Mirror Co 6/12/2000  
101 UNUM Corp - Provident Cos 6/30/1999  
102 Valero Energy Corp - Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp 12/31/2001  
103 Viacom Inc - CBS Corp 5/4/2000  
104 VoiceStream Wireless Corp - Omnipoint Corp 2/28/2000  
105 Walt Disney - Capital Cities 2/9/1996  
106 Washington Mutual Bank - Great Western Financial 7/2/1997  
107 Washington Mutual Inc - HF Ahmanson & Co 10/1/1998  
108 WebMethods Inc - Active Software Inc 8/16/2000  
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Appendix D 
Hypotheses Betas 
Hyp DV  Beta Sig 
H1 ROA Control – relative size -.093 .341 
  Target exec as % of post-merger firm -.069 .482 
 Jensen’s alpha Control – relative size -.058 .576 
  Target exec as % of post-merger firm -.003 .979 
H2A ROA Control – relative size .026 .744 
  Prestige - ∆ elite educ .160 .045 
  Prestige - ∆ founder status -.577 .000 
  Prestige - ∆ for profit boards -.051 .512 
 Jensen’s alpha Control – relative size -.027 .789 
  Prestige - ∆ elite educ -.134 .177 
  Prestige - ∆ founder status -.189 .063 
  Prestige - ∆ for profit boards 0.72 .462 
H2B ROA Control – relative size -.102 .313 
  Expert - ∆ tenure as an exec .047 .704 
  Expert - ∆ tenure in the org -.014 .914 
  Expert - ∆ level of education -.022 .824 
 Jensen’s alpha Control – relative size -.093 .350 
  Expert - ∆ tenure as an exec -.023 .849 
  Expert - ∆ tenure in the org .219 .080 
  Expert - ∆ level of education .007 .941 
H3A Exec retention Control – relative size .096 .306 
  Prestige - ∆ elite educ -.241 .012 
  Prestige - ∆ founder status -.169 .075 
  Prestige - ∆ for profit boards -.022 .813 
H3B Exec retention Control – relative size .069 .497 
  Expert - ∆ tenure as an exec .112 .399 
  Expert - ∆ tenure in the org -.124 .359 
  Expert - ∆ level of education -.005 .956 
H4A ROA Control – relative size -.147 .152 
  Prestige power – target higher  .089 .362 
  Actual retention – expected retention -.137 .181 
 Jensen’s alpha Control – relative size -.053 .606 
  Prestige power – target higher  -.058 .555 
  Actual retention – expected retention .001 .996 
H4B ROA Control – relative size -.133 .193 
  Expert power – target higher  -.095 .330 
  Actual retention – expected retention -.126 .216 
 Jensen’s alpha Control – relative size -.052 .613 
  Expert power – target higher  -.071 .471 
  Actual retention – expected retention .001 .990 
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Hyp DV  Beta Sig 
H5A Exec retention Control – relative size .087 .344 
  CEO structural power change .339 .000 
 ROA Control – relative size -.099 .310 
  CEO structural power change -.080 .412 
 Jensen alpha Control – relative size -.056 .563 
  CEO structural power change -.044 .649 
H6A P-Mgr Prestige pwr Control – relative size .078 .382 
  Target elite educ .107 .250 
  Target boards .458 .000 
  Acq firm Fin slack  .207 .853 
  Fin slack*target elite education -.214 .849 
  Fin slack*target boards .027 .761 
H6B P-Mgr Expert pwr Control – relative size .187 .072 
  Target – tenure as an exec .156 .256 
  Target – tenure in organization .077 .581 
  Target – education level -.066 .495 
  Acq firm fin slack  -9.056 .108 
  Fin slack*target tenure as an exec -1.291 .190 
  Fin slack*target tenure in org .753 .355 
  Fin slack*target education level 9.531 .110 
H7A P-Mgr Prestige pwr Control – relative size .100 .237 
  Target elite educ .097 .289 
  Target boards .351 .000 
  Target founder -.071 .435 
  HR acq slack  -1.873 .659 
  HR acq slack*target elite education 1.893 .655 
  HR acq slack*target boards .266 .006 
  HR acq slack*target founder .063 .532 
H7B P-Mgr Expert pwr Control – relative size .224 .027 
  Target – tenure as an exec .314 .018 
  Target  – tenure in organization -.201 .151 
  Target – education level -.110 .266 
  HR acq slack  -5.841 .164 
  HR acq slack*target tenure as an exec -1.065 .443 
  HR acq slack*target tenure in org .606 .540 
  HR acq slack*target education level 6.260 .132 
H7C P-Mgr Prestige pwr Control – relative size .110 .225 
  Target elite educ .101 .248 
  Target boards .449 .000 
  Target founder -.045 .605 
  HR target slack  -.227 .973 
  HR target slack*target elite education .206 .975 
  HR target slack*target boards .148 .135 
  HR target slack*target founder .093 .286 
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Hyp DV  Beta Sig 
H7D P-Mgr Expert pwr Control – relative size .223 .037 
  Target – tenure as an exec .295 .029 
  Target  – tenure in organization -.153 .279 
  Target – education level -.064 .513 
  HR target slack  1.802 .278 
  HR target slack*target tenure as exec -.253 .313 
  HR target slack*target tenure in org .557 .419 
  HR target slack*target education level -.375 .863 
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